Economic natural selection in Bertrand and Cournot settings

Cheng-Zhong Qin (), Burkhard Hehenkamp and Charles Stuart

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1999, vol. 9, issue 2, 224 pages

Abstract: We study economic natural selection in classical oligopoly settings. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of prices, convex monotonic dynamics always converge under a weak condition to the smallest price in the support of the initial state that exceeds marginal cost. When underlying pure strategies consist of a finite number of quantities, monotonic dynamics always converge under a specific condition to a quantity equal or similar to classical Cournot equilibrium.

Keywords: Oligopoly; Bertrand equilibrium; Cournot equilibrium; Natural selection; Evolutionary games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-05-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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