Little Perfection and Complexity

Alejandro Neme ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1993, vol. 22, issue 4, 309-18

Abstract: We consider the infinitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma with lexicographic complexity costs, where transitional complexity between states is included as one aspect of overall strategic complexity. We prove that a full folk theorem obtains in presence of any level of perfection of the equilibrium strategy, if the players consider off-equilibrium path payoff prior to minimizing complexity.

Date: 1993
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Working Paper: Little Perfection and Complexity (1991)
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