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International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2020

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

Game Theory Society
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Volume 49, issue 3, 2020

Bill Sandholm in Memoriam pp. 673-680 Downloads
Larry Samuelson and Jörgen Weibull
Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players pp. 681-697 Downloads
Takuya Iimura
Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies pp. 699-710 Downloads
Eleonora Braggion, Nicola Gatti, Roberto Lucchetti, Tuomas Sandholm and Bernhard von Stengel
Common belief in future and restricted past rationality pp. 711-747 Downloads
Rubén Becerril-Borja and Andrés Perea
Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests pp. 749-771 Downloads
Aner Sela
Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers pp. 773-800 Downloads
Armando Gomes and Wilfredo Maldonado
Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency pp. 801-831 Downloads
Z. Emel Öztürk
Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition pp. 833-849 Downloads
Pablo Amoros
Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution pp. 851-873 Downloads
Manfred Besner
Analytical solution of kth price auction pp. 875-884 Downloads
Martin Mihelich and Yan Shu
Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock–scissors–paper game pp. 885-912 Downloads
Liliana Garrido-da-Silva and Sofia B. S. D. Castro

Volume 49, issue 2, 2020

Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents pp. 345-384 Downloads
Yangbo Song and Mihaela Schaar
Two-person pairwise solvable games pp. 385-409 Downloads
Takuya Iimura, Toshimasa Maruta and Takahiro Watanabe
Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions pp. 411-444 Downloads
Helmuts Azacis
Bilateral trading with contingent contracts pp. 445-461 Downloads
Kiho Yoon
Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models pp. 463-494 Downloads
Shunsuke Hanato
Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence pp. 495-524 Downloads
Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby
Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures pp. 525-546 Downloads
Yukihiko Funaki, Harold Houba and Evgenia Motchenkova
Information sharing in democratic mechanisms pp. 547-577 Downloads
Volker Britz and Hans Gersbach
The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games pp. 579-599 Downloads
Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo and Estela Sánchez Rodríguez
Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? pp. 601-637 Downloads
Felipe Balmaceda
Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game pp. 639-650 Downloads
Shiran Rachmilevitch
A model of parallel contests pp. 651-672 Downloads
Wei-Torng Juang, Guang-Zhen Sun and Kuo-Chih Yuan

Volume 49, issue 1, 2020

Labelling, homophily and preference evolution pp. 1-22 Downloads
Jiabin Wu
On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money pp. 23-45 Downloads
Michal Krol and Magdalena Ewa Krol
A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability pp. 47-74 Downloads
Daniel Danau and Annalisa Vinella
Dominance of weighted nested split graph networks in connections models pp. 75-96 Downloads
Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano
Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities pp. 97-117 Downloads
Takaaki Abe
Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory pp. 119-145 Downloads
Aleksei Kondratev and Vladimir V. Mazalov
Fair division in the presence of externalities pp. 147-172 Downloads
Oskar Skibski and Tomasz Michalak
Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems pp. 173-193 Downloads
Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga
A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information pp. 195-225 Downloads
Andrés Salamanca
Associated consistency, value and graphs pp. 227-249 Downloads
Gérard Hamiache and Florian Navarro
Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information pp. 251-273 Downloads
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov
Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies pp. 275-298 Downloads
Bary S. R. Pradelski and Heinrich H. Nax
Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity pp. 299-320 Downloads
Ori Haimanko
The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games pp. 321-344 Downloads
Jasper Jong and Marc Uetz

Volume 48, issue 4, 2019

Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment pp. 1001-1031 Downloads
Oliver Kirchkamp and J. Philipp Reiß
Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games pp. 1033-1054 Downloads
Jiwoong Lee, Rudolf Müller and Dries Vermeulen
Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching pp. 1055-1085 Downloads
Bo Chen
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions pp. 1087-1109 Downloads
Tamás Solymosi
Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval pp. 1111-1137 Downloads
Bertrand Mbama Engoulou and Lawrence Diffo Lambo
Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers pp. 1139-1167 Downloads
Daeyoung Jeong
Self-recognition in teams pp. 1169-1201 Downloads
Joshua Gans and Peter Landry
Lies and consequences pp. 1203-1240 Downloads
Ivan Balbuzanov
Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games pp. 1241-1275 Downloads
Geir Asheim and Andrés Perea
Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté pp. 1277-1296 Downloads
Aviad Heifetz

Volume 48, issue 3, 2019

Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives pp. 713-753 Downloads
Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber and Alexei Zakharov
Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value pp. 755-768 Downloads
Ori Haimanko
An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems pp. 769-779 Downloads
Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara
Multiplayer games as extension of misère games pp. 781-796 Downloads
Koki Suetsugu
Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma pp. 797-834 Downloads
Kenju Kamei
Paths to stable allocations pp. 835-862 Downloads
Ágnes Cseh and Martin Skutella
Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization pp. 863-886 Downloads
Stefano Vannucci
Dynamic matching pennies on networks pp. 887-920 Downloads
Zhigang Cao, Cheng-zhong Qin, Xiaoguang Yang and Boyu Zhang
Strategic information transmission despite conflict pp. 921-956 Downloads
Stéphan Sémirat
Matching with restricted trade pp. 957-977 Downloads
Mustafa Afacan
Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games pp. 979-997 Downloads
André Casajus and Koji Yokote
My scientific first-born: a clarification pp. 999-1000 Downloads
Robert Aumann

Volume 48, issue 2, 2019

Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching pp. 365-392 Downloads
Jens Gudmundsson
PSPACE-complete two-color planar placement games pp. 393-410 Downloads
Kyle Burke and Robert A. Hearn
On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players pp. 411-421 Downloads
Avishay Aiche
Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata pp. 423-431 Downloads
O. V. Baskov
On random stable partitions pp. 433-480 Downloads
Boris Pittel
Differential game of optimal pursuit of one evader by many pursuers pp. 481-490 Downloads
Mehdi Salimi and Massimiliano Ferrara
A generalization of Arc-Kayles pp. 491-511 Downloads
Antoine Dailly, Valentin Gledel and Marc Heinrich
Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions pp. 513-541 Downloads
János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva
Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects pp. 543-569 Downloads
Tomoya Tajika and Tomoya Kazumura
Limited focus in dynamic games pp. 571-607 Downloads
Andrés Perea and Elias Tsakas
Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable pp. 609-645 Downloads
Martin Van der Linden
On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention pp. 647-671 Downloads
Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, Bertrand Tchantcho and Bill Proces Tsague
Rationalizability in multicriteria games pp. 673-685 Downloads
Yasuo Sasaki
Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference pp. 687-712 Downloads
Alice Peng-Ju Su

Volume 48, issue 1, 2019

Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices pp. 1-32 Downloads
Peter Streufert
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games pp. 33-59 Downloads
Gaëtan Fournier
Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency? pp. 61-80 Downloads
Philipp E. Otto and Daniel Dittmer
An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration pp. 81-108 Downloads
Brian R. Powers
Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information pp. 109-141 Downloads
Zhuozheng Li, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang
The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining pp. 143-155 Downloads
Suchan Chae and Seho Kim
The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs pp. 157-179 Downloads
Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn
An epistemic approach to stochastic games pp. 181-203 Downloads
Andrés Perea and Arkadi Predtetchinski
Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information pp. 205-242 Downloads
William Phan
Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems pp. 243-266 Downloads
Eun Jeong Heo
Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring pp. 267-285 Downloads
Daehyun Kim
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions pp. 287-310 Downloads
Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena
Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences pp. 311-336 Downloads
Andrea Gallice
Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies pp. 337-361 Downloads
Sven O. Krumke, Clemens Thielen, Philipp Weinschenk and Stephan Westphal
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