International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 50, issue 4, 2021

Legitimate equilibrium pp. 787-800

János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva

Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies pp. 801-827

Yusuke Kamishiro, Roberto Serrano and Myrna Wooders

Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs pp. 829-865

Mariya Teteryatnikova

Believing when credible: talking about future intentions and past actions pp. 867-889

Karl Schlag and Péter Vida

Sunspot equilibrium in positive recursive general quitting games pp. 891-909

Eilon Solan and Omri N. Solan

The (non-)robustness of influential cheap talk equilibria when the sender’s preferences are state independent pp. 911-925

Christoph Diehl and Christoph Kuzmics

Entry and social efficiency under Bertrand competition and asymmetric information pp. 927-944

Peyman Khezr and Flavio Menezes

Spatial competition on 2-dimensional markets and networks when consumers don’t always go to the closest firm pp. 945-970

Dodge Cahan, Hongjia H. Chen, Louis Christie and Arkadii Slinko

Improving efficiency in school choice under partial priorities pp. 971-987

Minoru Kitahara and Yasunori Okumura

Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge pp. 989-1019

Áron Tóbiás

Equilibrium payoffs in two-player discounted OLG games pp. 1021-1032

Chihiro Morooka

Fairness and fuzzy coalitions pp. 1033-1052

Chiara Donnini and Marialaura Pesce

An upper bound for the $$\ell _1$$ ℓ 1 -variation along the road to agreement pp. 1053-1067

Dimitry Shaiderman

Volume 50, issue 3, 2021

In memory of Victoria Kreps (3 September 1945–3 March 2021) pp. 597-601

Anna Bogomolnaia, Misha Gavrilovich, Egor Ianovski, Galina Lyapunova, Herve Moulin, Alexander Nesterov, Marina Sandomirskaia, Fedor Sandomirskiy and Elena Yanovskaya

Chomp on generalized Kneser graphs and others pp. 603-621

Ignacio García-Marco, Kolja Knauer and Luis Pedro Montejano

Three-player nim with podium rule pp. 623-633

Richard J. Nowakowski, Carlos P. Santos and Alexandre M. Silva

On the Sprague–Grundy function of extensions of proper Nim pp. 635-654

Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich, Nhan Bao Ho and Kazuhisa Makino

On lattices from combinatorial game theory: infinite case pp. 655-670

Alda Carvalho, Carlos P. Santos, Cátia Dias, Francisco Coelho, João P. Neto, Richard J. Nowakowski and Sandra Vinagre

Best play in Dots and Boxes endgames pp. 671-693

Daniel Allcock

Discrete Richman-bidding scoring games pp. 695-728

Ravi Kant Rai, Urban Larsson and Neel Patel

Linear evasion differential game of one evader and several pursuers with integral constraints pp. 729-750

Gafurjan Ibragimov, Massimiliano Ferrara, Marks Ruziboev and Bruno Antonio Pansera

A note on a Tarski type fixed-point theorem pp. 751-758

Roberto Ghiselli Ricci

The good, the bad, the well-connected pp. 759-771

Michael Wegener and Evla Mutlu

Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences pp. 773-785

Kazuhiko Hashimoto and Takuma Wakayama

Volume 50, issue 2, 2021

Equilibria in infinite games of incomplete information pp. 311-360

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau

Population monotonicity in fair division of multiple indivisible goods pp. 361-376

Emre Doğan

The value of information on deadlines; successful opaque management pp. 377-397

Marco Serena

Axiomatizations of the $$\beta $$ β and the score measures in networks pp. 399-418

Zhiwei Cui, Yan-An Hwang and Ding-Cheng You

Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains pp. 419-432

Shinji Ohseto

Step-by-step negotiations and utilitarianism pp. 433-445

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Effort of rugby teams according to the bonus point system: a theoretical and empirical analysis pp. 447-474

Federico Fioravanti, Fernando Tohmé, Fernando Delbianco and Alejandro Neme

Strategic information transmission with sender’s approval pp. 475-502

Françoise Forges and Jérôme Renault

Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm pp. 503-546

Yasushi Kawase and Keisuke Bando

Search for a moving target in a competitive environment pp. 547-557

Benoit Duvocelle, János Flesch, Hui Min Shi and Dries Vermeulen

Discrete stop-or-go games pp. 559-579

János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski and William Sudderth

Two-player pebbling on diameter 2 graphs pp. 581-596

Garth Isaak and Matthew Prudente

Volume 50, issue 1, 2021

Consistency of the equal split-off set pp. 1-22

Bas Dietzenbacher and Elena Yanovskaya

An issue based power index pp. 23-38

Qianqian Kong and Hans Peters

Identifying types in contest experiments pp. 39-61

Francesco Fallucchi, Andrea Mercatanti and Jan Niederreiter

An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games pp. 63-74

Werner Güth and Paul Pezanis-Christou

Option values in sequential auctions with time-varying valuations pp. 75-104

Amir Ban and Ron Lavi

Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets pp. 105-118

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi

Characterizing permissibility, proper rationalizability, and iterated admissibility by incomplete information pp. 119-148

Shuige Liu

The roommate problem with externalities pp. 149-165

José Luis Contreras and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

The projective core of symmetric games with externalities pp. 167-183

Takaaki Abe and Yukihiko Funaki

Allocating the costs of cleaning a river: expected responsibility versus median responsibility pp. 185-214

Jorge Alcalde-Unzu, María Gómez-Rúa and Elena Molis

Receiver’s sensitivity and strategic information transmission in multi-sender cheap talk pp. 215-239

Hiromasa Ogawa

Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects pp. 241-278

Alex Barrachina, Yair Tauman and Amparo Urbano

Weighted voting procedure having a unique blocker pp. 279-295

Sanjay Bhattacherjee and Palash Sarkar

Cooperative games with partial information pp. 297-309

Daniel Li Li and Erfang Shan