International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 45, issue 4, 2016

Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games pp. 769-793

Adib Bagh

Differential games with asymmetric information and without Isaacs’ condition pp. 795-816

Rainer Buckdahn, Marc Quincampoix, Catherine Rainer and Yuhong Xu

Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities pp. 817-838

Dominik Karos

Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information pp. 839-857

Ori Haimanko and Atsushi Kajii

Building Nim pp. 859-873

Eric Duchêne, Matthieu Dufour, Silvia Heubach and Urban Larsson

Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems pp. 875-892

Ulrich Faigle and Michel Grabisch

Posterior renegotiation-proofness in a two-person decision problem pp. 893-931

Kei Kawakami

First-mover advantage in best-of series: an experimental comparison of role-assignment rules pp. 933-970

Bradley Ruffle and Oscar Volij

Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games pp. 971-984

Juan I. Block and David Levine

Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games pp. 985-1011

Maxwell Pak and Bing Xu

A monotonic core solution for convex TU games pp. 1013-1029

J. Arin and I. Katsev

Incentivizing advertiser networks to submit multiple bids pp. 1031-1052

Patrick Hummel, Randolph McAfee and Sergei Vassilvitskii

Reduced games and egalitarian solutions pp. 1053-1069

Francesc Llerena and Llúcia Mauri

AGM-consistency and perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Part II: from PBE to sequential equilibrium pp. 1071-1094

Giacomo Bonanno

Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy pp. 1095-1109

Jiuqiang Liu and Huihui Zhang

Sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games in terms of forbidden $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 subgames pp. 1111-1131

Endre Boros, Khaled Elbassioni, Vladimir Gurvich, Kazuhisa Makino and Vladimir Oudalov

Equilibria and centrality in link formation games pp. 1133-1151

Hannu Salonen

Volume 45, issue 1, 2016

Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games pp. 11-36

Francoise Forges, Ulrich Horst and Antoine Salomon

Subgame-perfection in recursive perfect information games, where each player controls one state pp. 205-237

J. Kuipers, J. Flesch, G. Schoenmakers and K. Vrieze

General limit value in zero-sum stochastic games pp. 353-374

Bruno Ziliotto

On the dispensable role of time in games of perfect information pp. 375-387

Dov Samet

Operator approach to values of stochastic games with varying stage duration pp. 389-410

Sylvain Sorin and Guillaume Vigeral

Values of vector measure market games and their representations pp. 411-433

Omer Edhan

Projections and functions of Nash equilibria pp. 435-459

Yehuda Levy

The complexity of interacting automata pp. 461-496

Olivier Gossner, Penelope Hernandez and Ron Peretz

Volume 44, issue 4, 2015

Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes pp. 785-813

Federico Quartieri and Ryusuke Shinohara

Dynamic multilateral markets pp. 815-833

Arnold Polanski and Emiliya Lazarova

Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 835-868

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games pp. 869-890

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Axioms of invariance for TU-games pp. 891-902

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games pp. 903-932

Heinrich Nax and Bary Pradelski

A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model pp. 933-948

Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan

Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price” pp. 949-991

Kalyan Chatterjee and Kaustav Das

Pillage games with multiple stable sets pp. 993-1013

Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber and Colin Rowat

Information, interaction and memory pp. 1015-1032

Virginie Masson

Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations pp. 1033-1048

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Erratum to: Voting power and proportional representation of voters pp. 1049-1049

Artyom Jelnov and Yair Tauman

Volume 44, issue 3, 2015

Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games pp. 515-541

Igal Milchtaich

Incentive compatible market design with applications pp. 543-569

M. Bumin Yenmez

All-pay 2 $$\times $$ × 2 Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities pp. 571-597

Dan Kovenock, Sudipta Sarangi and Matt Wiser

Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines pp. 599-629

Sjaak Hurkens and Nir Vulkan

On restricted bargaining sets pp. 631-645

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs pp. 647-666

Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer

Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning pp. 667-699

Georgios Chasparis, Jeff Shamma and Anders Rantzer

Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games pp. 701-732

Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri

Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games pp. 733-760

Stéphane Gonzalez and Michel Grabisch

On the number of positions in chess without promotion pp. 761-767

Stefan Steinerberger

An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders pp. 769-784

Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Volume 44, issue 2, 2015

Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint pp. 253-274

Gagan Ghosh

Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value pp. 275-293

Koji Yokote

Roughly weighted hierarchical simple games pp. 295-319

Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko

Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors pp. 321-346

Cy Maor and Eilon Solan

Search games on a network with travelling and search costs pp. 347-365

Vic Baston and Kensaku Kikuta

Core deviation minimizing auctions pp. 367-376

Isa Hafalir and Hadi Yektas

The conic property for vector measure market games pp. 377-386

Omer Edhan

Contests with endogenous entry pp. 387-424

Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao and Jingfeng Lu

A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List pp. 425-431

Marek Hudik

Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games pp. 433-448

Boyu Zhang and Josef Hofbauer

On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games pp. 449-471

René Brink, René Levínský and Miroslav Zelený

Stable sets in majority pillage games pp. 473-486

James Jordan and David Obadia

A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set pp. 487-498

Sergei Pechersky

Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise pp. 499-514

Katsuhiko Aiba

Volume 44, issue 1, 2015

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets pp. 1-15

Francesc Llerena, Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

The emergence of cooperation through leadership pp. 17-36

Shota Fujishima

On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability pp. 37-59

Aviad Heifetz and Andrés Perea

Prisoners’ other Dilemma pp. 61-81

Matthias Blonski and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers pp. 83-112

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting pp. 113-133

Ido Erev, Sharon Gilat-Yihyie, Davide Marchiori and Doron Sonsino

The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players pp. 135-151

Avishay Aiche, Anna Rubinchik and Benyamin Shitovitz

Mostly calibrated pp. 153-163

Yossi Feinberg and Nicolas Lambert

The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games pp. 165-193

Dieter Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer and Christoph Kuzmics

Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money pp. 195-207

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto and Shohei Tamura

Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching pp. 209-223

Francis Flanagan

The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences pp. 225-251

Nikolai Kukushkin