International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 23, issue 4, 1994

Indirect Control of Corporations pp. 287-302

Gianfranco Gambarelli and Guillermo Owen

On Nash Equilibrium Solutions in Nonzero-Sum Stochastic Games with Complete Information pp. 303-24

Heinz-Uwe Kuenle

Extension of the Perles-Maschler Solution to N-Person Bargaining Games pp. 325-46

Emilio Calvo Ramón and Esther Gutierrez

A Neo[superscript]2 Bayesian Foundation of the Maxmin Value for Two-Person Zero-Sum Games pp. 347-58

Sergiu Hart, Salvatore Modica and David Schmeidler

Volume 23, issue 3, 1994

Introspection and Equilibrium Selection in 2 x 22 Matrix Games pp. 183-206

Gonzalo Olcina and Amparo Urbano

The Theory of Normal Form Games form the Differentiable Viewpoint pp. 207-36

Klaus Ritzberger

A Model of a General Parimutuel System: Characterizations and Equilibrium Selection pp. 237-60

Takahiro Watanabe, Hideyuki Nonoyama and Masao Mori

Collusion Properties of Values pp. 261-81

Hans Haller

Volume 23, issue 2, 1994

"Eventually Revealing" Repeated Games with Incomplete Information pp. 89-99

Victor C Domansky and Victoria L Kreps

Responsive and Strong Responsive Evolutionary Dynamics pp. 101-17

Xiaohua Lu and Dale Stahl

An Algorithm for Finding the Nucleolus of Asignment Games pp. 119-43

Tamás Solymosi and Tirukkannamangai E S Raghavan

Cooperative Processing of Information via Choice at an Information Set pp. 145-65

Tatsuro Ichiishi, Adam Idzik and Jingang Zhao

Almost Strict Competitiveness in Extensive Games pp. 167-82

Subhashis Raychaudhuri

Volume 23, issue 1, 1994

Repeated Price Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs pp. 1-24

Till Requate

Dominant Strategy Mechanisms for Contract Auctions with Risk Aversion and Moral Hazard pp. 25-42

Frank Page

A Solidarity Value for n-Person Transferable Utility Games pp. 43-48

Andrzej Nowak and Tadeusz Radzik

Bargaining Sets with Small Coalitions pp. 49-55

Ulla Schjodt and Birgitte Sloth

On Games with Stochastically Dependent Strategies pp. 57-64

Victoria L Kreps

Cooperation by Indirect Revelation through Strategic Behavior pp. 65-74

Robert Lapson

Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities pp. 75-83

Jinpeng Ma

Volume 22, issue 4, 1993

Little Perfection and Complexity pp. 309-18

Alejandro Neme

A Value for Games with n Players and r Alternatives pp. 319-34

Edward M Bolger

A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games pp. 335-44

Cheng-Zhong Qin

Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case pp. 345-57

Roberto Serrano

A Dynamic Variant of the Battle of the Sexes pp. 359-80

Gustav Feichtinger and Franz Wirl

Focal Points and Bargaining pp. 381-409

Ken Binmore, Joe Swierzbinski, Steven Hsu and Chris Proulx

Volume 22, issue 3, 1993

Finitely Additive and Measurable Stochastic Games pp. 201-23

A Maitra and W Sudderth

Computational Complexity to Verify the Unstability of Effectivity Function pp. 225-39

Masayoshi Mizutani, Yasuhiko Hiraide and Hisakazu Nishino

The Prenucleolus and the Reduced Game Property: Equal Treatment Replaces Anonymity pp. 241-48

Gooni Orshan

A Path-Following Procedure to Find a Proper Equilibrium of Finite Games pp. 249-59

Yoshitsugu Yamamoto

Demand Commitment Bargaining in Three-Person Quota Game Experiments pp. 261-77

Reinhard Selten and Bettina Kuon

Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games pp. 279-302

Jordi Brandts and Charles Holt

Volume 22, issue 2, 1993

On a Deception Game with Three Boxes pp. 89-95

King-Tak Lee

On the Set of Proper Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game pp. 97-106

Mathijs Jansen

Strategic Stability in Repeated Signaling Games pp. 107-21

Inkoo Cho

The Value of Certain pNA Games through Infinite-Dimensional Banach Spaces pp. 123-39

Joseph James Sroka

Commitments to Threat Strategies in Nash Bargaining pp. 141-51

Wen Mao

The Logical Representation of Extensive Games pp. 153-69

Giacomo Bonanno

Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information pp. 171-98

Michael Mitzkewitz and Rosemarie Nagel

Volume 22, issue 1, 1993

Asymptotic Properties in Dynamic Programming pp. 1-11

Dov Monderer and Sylvain Sorin

The Shapley Value and Average Convex Games pp. 13-29

Elena Inarra and Jose M Usategui

Bounded Variation of {V(subscript)n} and Its Limit pp. 31-42

Ehud Lehrer

The Core of Discontinuous Games pp. 43-50

Van Kolpin

Efficiency by Trust in Fairness? Multiperiod Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments with an Increasing Cake pp. 51-73

Werner Guth, Peter Ockenfels and Markus Wendel

Cooperation in an Asymmetric Volunteer's Dilemma Game: Theory and Experimental Evidence pp. 75-85

Andreas Diekmann

Volume 21, issue 4, 1993

The Bayesian Formulation of Incomplete Information--The Non-compact Case pp. 329-338

Aviad Heifetz

On the Core of Information Graph Games pp. 339-50

Jeroen Kuipers

A Shapley Value for Games with Restricted Coalitions pp. 351-60

Jean Derks and Hans Peters

On the Determinateness of Semi-infinite Bimatrix Games pp. 361-369

Peter Jurg and Stef Tijs

A Value for Partially Defined Cooperative Games pp. 371-84

Stephen J Willson

Search Games with Immobile Hider pp. 385-94

Hans Reijnierse and J A M Potters

Solvable States in Stochastic Games pp. 395-404

Nicolas Vielle

The Not-Quite Non-atomic Game: Normal Approximation pp. 405-17

Guillermo Owen

Monotonic Games Are Spanning Network Games pp. 419-27

Anne van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs and Michael Maschler

Nash Equilibria of Discontinuous Non-Zero-Sum Two-Person Games pp. 429-37

Tadeusz Radzik

Volume 21, issue 3, 1992

Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and Strategy-Proofness in Location Problems pp. 221-35

Hans Peters, Hans van der Stel and Ton Storcken

On Simple MIX Game pp. 237-47

Andrey Garnaev

The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints pp. 249-66

Ulrich Faigle and W Kern

Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games pp. 267-90

I Barany, J Lee and Martin Shubik

Unilaterally Competitive Games pp. 291-99

Amoz Kats and Jacques Thisse

Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games pp. 301-12

Chih-Ru Hsiao and T E S Raghavan

The Quality Guaranteeing Price with Market Anonymity pp. 313-23

Moshe Adler

Volume 21, issue 2, 1992

The Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms pp. 109-29

Frank Weidner

Bargaining with a Ruler pp. 131-48

Ishay Buch and Yair Tauman

A Short Proof of the Inclusion of the Core in the Weber Set pp. 149-50

Jean Derks

On the Game of Googol pp. 151-60

Theodore P Hill and Ulrich Krengel

Repeated Games with Absorbing States and No Signals pp. 161-74

Jean-Michel Coulomb

The Compromise Value for NTU-Games pp. 175-89

Peter Borm, H Keiding, Richard McLean, S Oortwijn and S Tijs

On Bargaining Position Descriptions in Non-transferable Utility Games: Symmetry versus Asymmetry pp. 191-211

Eyal Winter

Agreeing to Disagree in Infinite Information Structures pp. 213-18

Dov Samet

Volume 21, issue 1, 1992

The Consistent Shapley Value in Hyperplane Games from a Global Standpoint pp. 1-11

Gooni Orshan

"Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance pp. 13-25

Tilman Börgers and Larry Samuelson

Weighted Values and the Core pp. 27-39

Dov Monderer, Dov Samet and Lloyd Shapley

On the Sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern Abstract Stable Sets: The Stable and the Individual Stable Bargaining Set pp. 41-55

Joseph Greenberg

Suboptimality of M-Step Back Strategies in Bayesian Games pp. 57-74

S C Young and J Q Smith

The Kernel, the Bargaining Set and the Reduced Game pp. 75-83

Chih Chang and Ching-Yu Kan

The General Nucleolus and the Reduced Game Property pp. 85-106

M Maschler, J A M Potters and S H Tijs