International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 52, issue 4, 2023

Professor Stef Tijs (1937–2023) pp. 953-955

Peter Borm and Hans Peters

Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information pp. 957-992

Chirantan Ganguly and Indrajit Ray

Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility pp. 993-1007

Ville Korpela

Asymmetric majority pillage games pp. 1009-1035

Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat and Naoki Yoshihara

Making friends meet: network formation with introductions pp. 1037-1076

Jan-Peter Siedlarek

Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility pp. 1077-1110

Jihwan Do

Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields pp. 1111-1151

Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang

Nash equilibria in random games with right fat-tailed distributions pp. 1153-1177

Ting Pei and Satoru Takahashi

Submixing and shift-invariant stochastic games pp. 1179-1214

Hugo Gimbert and Edon Kelmendi

Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution pp. 1215-1260

Dai Zusai

On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange pp. 1261-1290

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal and Damiano Turchet

Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult pp. 1291-1316

Manuel Foerster

Best-response equilibrium: an equilibrium in finitely additive mixed strategies pp. 1317-1334

Igal Milchtaich

Volume 52, issue 3, 2023

Complexity of stability in trading networks pp. 629-648

Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Ildikó Schlotter and Alexander Teytelboym

Equilibria in bottleneck games pp. 649-685

Ryo Kawasaki, Hideo Konishi and Junki Yukawa

Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency pp. 687-701

Sylvain Béal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Philippe Solal and Peter Sudhölter

Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games pp. 703-735

Torsten Heinrich, Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo, Marco Pangallo, Alex Scott, Bassel Tarbush and Samuel Wiese

The “desire to conform” and dynamic search by a committee pp. 737-756

Murali Agastya and Jorge Rojas-Vallejos

Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set pp. 757-774

Takaaki Abe and Satoshi Nakada

Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment pp. 775-804

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter

Establishing human connections: experimental evidence from the helping game pp. 805-832

Miriam Al Lily

Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option pp. 833-860

Jin Hyuk Choi and Kookyoung Han

Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns pp. 861-889

Jian Yang

A threshold model of urban development pp. 891-924

Alberto Vesperoni and Paul Schweinzer

Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility pp. 925-951

Zhonghao Shui

Volume 52, issue 2, 2023

Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value pp. 333-362

Özer Selçuk and Takamasa Suzuki

When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships pp. 363-399

Alejandro Francetich

Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry pp. 401-421

Xin Feng

Entry in first-price auctions with signaling pp. 423-450

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts

Marginality and a Characterization of the Owen Graph value pp. 451-461

Erfang Shan

The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders pp. 463-483

Arnold Polanski and Mark Quement

Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule pp. 485-516

Takaomi Notsu

Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation pp. 517-553

Takuma Wakayama and Takehiko Yamato

Buyers’ welfare maximizing auction design pp. 555-567

Sebastián D. Bauer

Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization pp. 569-586

R. A. Edwards and R. R. Routledge

All-pay matching contests pp. 587-606

Aner Sela

Horizontal product differentiation in Varian’s model of sales pp. 607-627

Kuninori Nakagawa

Volume 52, issue 1, 2023

Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly pp. 1-31

Minghua Chen, Konstantinos Serfes and Eleftherios Zacharias

Resource inequality in the war of attrition pp. 33-61

Bingchao Huangfu, Gagan Ghosh and Heng Liu

Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies pp. 63-92

Gustavo Bergantiños and Adriana Navarro-Ramos

Additive adjudication of conflicting claims pp. 93-116

Jaume García-Segarra and Miguel Ginés-Vilar

Network disruption and the common-enemy effect pp. 117-155

Britta Hoyer and Kris De Jaegher

Signaling games with endogenous types pp. 157-174

Inkoo Cho

(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games pp. 175-193

Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin and Çağrı Sağlam

Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction pp. 195-230

Fredrik Ødegaard and Charles Zheng

The minimum set of $$\mu $$ μ -compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game pp. 231-252

Keisuke Bando and Yakuma Furusawa

Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems pp. 253-272

Christian Trudeau

Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems pp. 273-301

Tami Tamir

Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes pp. 303-332

Jingfeng Lu, Zhewei Wang and Lixue Zhou

Volume 51, issue 3, 2022

Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games pp. 451-481

Makoto Shimoji

Sequential competition and the strategic origins of preferential attachment pp. 483-508

Antoine Mandel and Xavier Venel

Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents pp. 509-536

Ana Mauleon, Simon Schopohl, Akylai Taalaibekova and Vincent Vannetelbosch

Object reallocation problems under single-peaked preferences: two characterizations of the crawler pp. 537-565

Yuki Tamura

Charges and bets: a general characterisation of common priors pp. 567-587

Ziv Hellman and Miklós Pintér

Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm pp. 589-605

Françoise Forges and József Sákovics

Correction to: Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution pp. 607-608

Manfred Besner

Correction to: Lorenz comparisons of nine rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims pp. 609-611

Kristof Bosmans and Luc Lauwers

Volume 51, issue 2, 2022

On $$\alpha $$ α -constant-sum games pp. 279-291

Wenna Wang, René van den Brink, Hao Sun, Genjiu Xu and Zhengxing Zou

The Lipschitz constant of perturbed anonymous games pp. 293-306

Ron Peretz, Amnon Schreiber and Ernst Schulte-Geers

On the relationship between p-dominance and stochastic stability in network games pp. 307-351

Daniel Opolot

The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility pp. 353-377

Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu, Rong Zou and Dongshuang Hou

Intervention with limited information pp. 379-389

Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine

Ordinal imitative dynamics pp. 391-412

George Loginov

Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games pp. 413-429

Bas Dietzenbacher and Peter Sudhölter

The priority value for cooperative games with a priority structure pp. 431-450

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières and Philippe Solal

Volume 51, issue 1, 2022

Cyclical behavior of evolutionary dynamics in coordination games with changing payoffs pp. 1-27

George Loginov

Nash blocks pp. 29-51

Peter Wikman

An epistemic approach to explaining cooperation in the finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma pp. 53-85

Vi Cao

Some new results on generalized additive games pp. 87-118

Stefano Moretti and Henk Norde

Optimal contracts with random monitoring pp. 119-154

Andrei Barbos

Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets pp. 155-167

Marilda Sotomayor

Simplified group activity selection with group size constraints pp. 169-212

Andreas Darmann, Janosch Döcker, Britta Dorn and Sebastian Schneckenburger

Existence of value for a differential game with asymmetric information and signal revealing pp. 213-247

Xiaochi Wu

The equal collective gains value in cooperative games pp. 249-278

Emilio Calvo Ramón and Esther Gutiérrez-López