The “desire to conform” and dynamic search by a committee

Murali Agastya and Jorge Rojas-Vallejos

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 3, No 5, 737-756

Abstract: Abstract We consider dynamic search by a committee where members exhibit an innate desire to conform to the committee’s decision, in addition to their economic incentives. This gives rise to multiple equilibria. “Conformal” equilibria now exist, at least one in which every member votes to continue (stop) the search except on receiving private signals from a set of small but positive measure. A “regular” equilibrium also exists, close to the unique equilibrium that occurs when there is no desire to conform. These equilibria can be Pareto ranked, however, under a certain restriction on the prior distribution of candidates, the regular equilibrium is the Pareto superior equilibrium, provided the voting occurs under a simple or a super-majority rule. Nonetheless, in this equilibrium, the desire to conform causes the committee to increase the minimum acceptable standard of a candidate for the search to stop, and increases the expected search duration.

Keywords: Search; Voting; Committees; Conformity; Belongingness theory of motivation; Preference for winning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00838-3

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