Some remarks on the modeling of discrete matching markets

Marilda Sotomayor ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2022, vol. 51, issue 1, No 6, 155-167

Abstract: Abstract This paper shows that the college admissions model with responsive preferences is not always satisfactory for representing real college admissions markets. Simple examples are used to illustrate real situations, in which the knowledge of the preferences of the institutions over all possible assignments of candidates is necessary for the analysis of relevant problems for the markets under consideration.

Keywords: Cooperative equilibrium; Stability; Matching; Pairwise-stability; Choice-function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00788-8

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