International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 33, issue 4, 2005

Equilibrium with strategy-dependent trembles pp. 461-465

Jonathan Hamilton and Steven Slutsky

The modiclus and core stability pp. 467-478

T. Raghavan and Peter Sudhölter

An axiomatization of minimal curb sets pp. 479-490

Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets and Henk Norde

The core cover in relation to the nucleolus and the Weber set pp. 491-503

Marieke Quant, Peter Borm, Hans Reijnierse and Bas van Velzen

A characterization of the position value* pp. 505-514

Marco Slikker

Stability of pure strategy sampling equilibria pp. 515-521

Michał Ramsza

Nonsymmetric values under Hart-Mass-Colell consistency pp. 523-534

N. Naumova

College admissions with affirmative action pp. 535-549

Atila Abdulkadiroğlu

A dynamic approach to the Shapley value based on associated games pp. 551-562

Yan-An Hwang, Jie-Hau Li and Yaw-Hwa Hsiao

Volume 33, issue 3, 2005

Multi-utilitarianism in two-agent quasilinear social choice pp. 315-334

Christopher Chambers

A characterization of plurality-like rules based on non-manipulability, restricted efficiency, and anonymity pp. 335-354

Biung-Ghi Ju

An axiomatization of the consistent non-transferable utility value pp. 355-366

Sergiu Hart

The Nash rationing problem pp. 367-377

Marco Mariotti and Antonio Villar

Constitutional implementation of social choice correspondences pp. 381-396

Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Values for strategic games in which players cooperate pp. 397-419

Luisa Carpente, Balbina Casas-Méndez, Ignacio García-Jurado and Anne van den Nouweland

The Böhm–Bawerk horse market: a cooperative analysis pp. 421-430

Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

Farsighted Stability in an n-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma pp. 431-445

Akihiro Suzuki and Shigeo Muto

Strongly essential coalitions and the nucleolus of peer group games pp. 447-460

Rodica Brânzei, Tamás Solymosi and Stef Tijs

Volume 33, issue 2, 2005

Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems pp. 159-180

Jerry Green

On the existence of equilibria in discontinuous games: three counterexamples pp. 181-187

Guilherme Carmona

Stable cores of large games pp. 189-213

Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio

A short and constructive proof of Tarski’s fixed-point theorem pp. 215-218

Federico Echenique

A reinforcement learning process in extensive form games pp. 219-227

Jean-François Laslier and Bernard Walliser

Improvement dynamics in games with strategic complementarities pp. 229-238

Nikolai Kukushkin, Satoru Takahashi and Tetsuo Yamamori

On the survival of some unstable two-sided matching mechanisms pp. 239-254

Utku Unver

Ranking participants in generalized tournaments pp. 255-270

Giora Slutzki and Oscar Volij

Bargaining sets in exchange economies with indivisibilities and money pp. 271-285

M. Meertens, J. Potters and Hans Reijnierse

An experimental test of alternative models of bidding in ascending auctions pp. 287-313

R. Isaac, Tim Salmon and Arthur Zillante

Volume 33, issue 1, 2004

Network formation and anti-coordination games pp. 1-19

Yann Bramoullé, Dunia López-Pintado, Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo

General procedures leading to correlated equilibria pp. 21-40

Amotz Cahn

Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games pp. 41-54

Maciej Bukowski and Jacek Miekisz

A note on the nucleolus and the kernel of the assignment game pp. 55-65

Marina Núñez

The money-burning refinement: With an application to a political signalling game pp. 67-87

Hans Gersbach

Declining valuations in sequential auctions pp. 89-106

Thomas Kittsteiner, Jörg Nikutta and Eyal Winter

An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory pp. 107-114

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz and Carles Rafels

On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model pp. 115-128

Ruth Martínez Valenzuela, Jordi Masso, Alejandro Neme and Jorge Oviedo

Bargaining with commitments pp. 129-144

Juan Vidal-Puga

Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games pp. 145-158

Geoffroy de Clippel, Hans Peters and Horst Zank

Volume 32, issue 4, 2004

The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games pp. 431-442

Kiho Yoon

On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria pp. 443-453

Robert Nau, Sabrina Gomez Canovas and Pierre Hansen

Observation, Measurement, and Computation in Finite Games pp. 455-470

Kislaya Prasad

Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior pp. 471-477

Burkhard Schipper

Punishment strategies make the α-coalitional game ordinally convex and balanced pp. 479-483

Takuya Masuzawa

Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games pp. 485-500

Elena Yanovskaya

Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing pp. 501-518

Eric J. Friedman

Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures pp. 519-531

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

A mean value for games with communication structures pp. 533-544

Gerard Hamiache

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems pp. 545-560

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus

Semi-cooperative strategies for differential games pp. 561-593

Alberto Bressan and Wen Shen

On three Shapley-like solutions for cooperative games with random payoffs pp. 595-613

Judith Timmer, Peter Borm and Stef Tijs

Volume 32, issue 3, 2004

The simple geometry of perfect information games pp. 315-338

Stefano Demichelis, Klaus Ritzberger and Jeroen Swinkels

An equivalent definition of stable Equilibria pp. 339-357

Srihari Govindan and Jean-François Mertens

Symmetry and p-Stability pp. 359-369

Srihari Govindan, Arndt von Schemde and Bernhard von Stengel

Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof pp. 371-377

John Hillas, Mathijs Jansen, Jos Potters and Dries Vermeulen

Localization of the degree on lower-dimensional sets pp. 379-386

Jean-François Mertens

Ordinality in non cooperative games pp. 387-430

Jean-François Mertens

Volume 32, issue 2, 2003

On cooperative games, inseparable by semivalues pp. 181-188

Rafael Amer, Jean Derks and José Miguel Giménez

The core and the bargaining set in glove-market games pp. 189-204

Yevgenia Apartsin and Ron Holzman

On finding curb sets in extensive games pp. 205-210

Vitaly Pruzhansky

Fundamental cycles of pre-imputations in non-balanced TU-games pp. 211-221

Juan Cesco

Shapley value for constant-sum games pp. 223-227

Anna B. Khmelnitskaya

Pure Nash equilibria in finite two-person non-zero-sum games pp. 229-240

Wojciech Połowczuk

Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism pp. 241-251

Marilda Sotomayor

The Harsanyi-Shapley solution and independence of irrelevant expansions pp. 253-271

Chih Chang and Yan-An Hwang

Hide and seek in Arizona pp. 273-293

Robert Rosenthal, Jason Shachat and Mark Walker

Simple random order methods to share costs pp. 295-314

Yuntong Wang

Volume 32, issue 1, 2003

Preface pp. 1-1

Sylvain Sorin

A two armed bandit type problem pp. 3-16

Michel Benaïm and Gerard Ben Arous

Positive value of information in games pp. 17-31

Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini and Shmuel Zamir

Existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium feedback for a simple nonzero-sum differential game pp. 33-71

Pierre Cardaliaguet and Slawomir Plaskacz

Stochastic games without perfect monitoring pp. 73-96

Coulomb J-M

Borel stay-in-a-set games pp. 97-108

A. Maitra and W. Sudderth

A value on ′AN pp. 109-120

Jean-François Mertens and Abraham Neyman

On a new class of nonzero-sum discounted stochastic games having stationary Nash equilibrium points pp. 121-132

Andrzej Nowak

The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring pp. 133-150

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan and Nicolas Vieille

The reproducible properties of correct forecasts pp. 151-159

Alvaro Sandroni

Making solutions invariant pp. 161-180

Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen and J. A. M. Potters