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An intersection theorem in TU cooperative game theory

Javier Martínez-de-Albéniz and Carles Rafels ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 33, issue 1, 107-114

Abstract: We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete separation theorem (Frank, 1982). We introduce a definition of general largeness, proving that the Weber set is large for any cooperative game. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: cooperative game; core; Weber set; separation theorem; large core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:107-114

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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400188

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