Positive value of information in games

Bruno Bassan (), Olivier Gossner, Marco Scarsini and Shmuel Zamir ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2003, vol. 32, issue 1, 17-31

Abstract: We exhibit a general class of interactive decision situations in which all the agents benefit from more information. This class includes as a special case the classical comparison of statistical experiments à la Blackwell. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2003

Keywords: Information structures; Value of information; Pareto optima (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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Working Paper: Positive value of information in games (2003)
Working Paper: Positive value of information in games (2003)
Working Paper: Positive value of information in games (2002)
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DOI: 10.1007/s001820300142

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