International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 27, issue 4, 1998

Spanning network games pp. 467-500

Daniel Granot and Michael Maschler

Crowding games are sequentially solvable pp. 501-509

Igal Milchtaich

Weighted Aumann-Shapley pricing pp. 511-523

William Sharkey and Richard McLean

Stationary and nonstationary strategies in Hotelling's model of spatial competition with repeated pricing decisions pp. 525-537

Kali Rath

Repeated proximity games pp. 539-559

Jérôme Renault and Tristan Tomala

On saddlepoints of two-person zero-sum games with applications to data verification tests pp. 561-576

Hans-Peter Battenberg and Bernd-Jürgen Falkowski

Duality and markovian strategies pp. 577-597

Dinah Rosenberg

Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability pp. 599-609

Karl Wärneryd

Note Core and monotonic allocation methods pp. 611-616

David Housman and Lori Clark (*),

Volume 27, issue 3, 1998

On the impact of an event pp. 315-330

Sylvain Sorin

Mixing weighted values of non-atomic games pp. 331-342

Juan Carlos Santos and José Zarzuelo

The speed of convergence in repeated games with incomplete information on one side pp. 343-357

Jean-François Mertens

Characterization sets for the nucleolus pp. 359-374

D. Granot, F. Granot and W. R. Zhu

Population uncertainty and Poisson games pp. 375-392

Roger Myerson

Paths leading to the Nash set for nonsmooth games pp. 393-405

Yakar Kannai and Emmanuel Tannenbaum (*),

Dominance or maximin: How to solve an English auction pp. 407-426

Ulrich Kamecke

Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design pp. 427-441

E. Elisabet RutstrÃm

Note Computing the nucleolus of min-cost spanning tree games is NP-hard pp. 443-450

Jeroen Kuipers, Ulrich Faigle and Walter Kern

Note On the core of a collection of coalitions pp. 451-459

Hans Reijnierse and Jean Derks

Volume 27, issue 2, 1998

On implementation via demand commitment games pp. 161-189

Y. Chiu and Ani Dasgupta

On consistent solutions for strategic games pp. 191-200

Graziano Pieri, Fioravante Patrone, Anna Torre and Stef Tijs

Equilibria in repeated games of incomplete information: The general symmetric case pp. 201-210

Abraham Neyman and Sylvain Sorin

Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games pp. 211-217

Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Stef Tijs, Ana Meca-Martínez and I. García-Jurando

Weak topology and infinite matrix games pp. 219-229

Luciano Mendez-Naya

-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games pp. 231-244

Ehud Lehrer and Sylvain Sorin

Link formation in cooperative situations pp. 245-256

Stef Tijs, Anne van den Nouweland and Bhaskar Dutta

Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs pp. 257-267

A. Maitra and W. Sudderth

Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness pp. 269-299

Gary Bolton, Rami Zwick and Elena Katok

A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game pp. 301-303

Theo S. H. Driessen

Iterated dominance in quasisupermodular games with strict single crossing property pp. 305-309

Hannu Salonen and Klaus Kultti

Volume 27, issue 1, 1998

On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions pp. 1-19

Mitsunobu Miyake

Multi-level evolution in population games pp. 21-35

José Canals and Fernando Vega-Redondo

The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games pp. 37-47

Bezalel Peleg, Stef Tijs, Peter Borm and Gert-Jan Otten

Rationality and the definition of consistent pairs pp. 49-59

Christian Ewerhart

On the existence of good stationary strategies for nonleavable stochastic games pp. 61-81

Piercesare Secchi

Nash equilibrium and the law of large numbers pp. 83-92

Mario Pascoa

Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation pp. 93-109

Tristan Tomala

Geanakoplos and Sebenius model with noise pp. 111-130

Doron Sonsino

Values and potential of games with cooperation structure pp. 131-145

Jesús Bilbao

Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter? pp. 147-156

Wojciech Olszewski

Volume 26, issue 4, 1998

A Demand Adjustment Process pp. 423-438

William Zame, Michael Maschler and Elaine Bennett

Satisficing Leads to Cooperation in Mutual Interests Games pp. 439-453

Amit Pazgal

On the Game-Theoretic Structure of Public-Good Economies pp. 455-472

Yves Sprumont

Strategy-Proofness and "Median Voters" pp. 473-490

Stephen Ching

On the Cores of Cooperative Games and the Stability of the Weber Set pp. 491-499

Stef Tijs and Carles Rafels

Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions pp. 501-524

Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson

Dynamic Stability in Symmetric Extensive Form Games pp. 525-547

Ross Cressman

On the Asymptotic Convergence to Mixed Equilibria in 2 x 2 Asymmetric Games pp. 549-559

Maria Saez-Marti

Convex Covers of Symmetric Games pp. 561-577

John M. Rulnick and Lloyd Shapley

Note Some Bounds for Markov Chains pp. 579-582

Mark B. Cronshaw and Levon S. Kazarian

Volume 26, issue 3, 1997

Quasi-Cores in Bargaining Sets pp. 283-302

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Cyclic Markov Equilibria in Stochastic Games pp. 303-314

Janos Flesch, Frank Thuijsman and Koos Vrieze

Finitely Additive and Epsilon Nash Equilibria pp. 315-333

Massimo Marinacci

Ternary Voting Games pp. 335-351

Moshé Machover and Dan S. Felsenthal

A Theorem on the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game pp. 353-359

Martin Shubik and Thomas Quint

On the Complexity of Testing Membership in the Core of Min-Cost Spanning Tree Games pp. 361-366

Ulrich Faigle, Walter Kern, Winfried Hochstättler and Sándor P. Fekete

Minimum Cost Forest Games pp. 367-377

Jeroen Kuipers

The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities pp. 379-401

Henry Tulkens and Parkash Chander

Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes pp. 403-408

Frank Thuijsman and Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan

note: Rotations: Matching Schemes that Efficiently Preserve the Best Reply Structure of a One Shot Game pp. 409-417

Ulrich Kamecke

Volume 26, issue 2, 1997

The Modified Nucleolus: Properties and Axiomatizations pp. 147-182

Peter SudhÃLter

The Deceptive Number Changing Game, in the Absence of Symmetry pp. 183-191

Bert Fristedt

On the Core of Routing Games pp. 193-205

Jean Derks and Jeroen Kuipers

The Reactive Bargaining Set of Some Flow Games and of Superadditive Simple Games pp. 207-214

Daniel Granot, Frieda Granot and Weiping R. Zhu

On the Infiltration Game pp. 215-221

P. Goutal, Andrey Garnaev and G. Garnaeva

Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games pp. 223-227

Abraham Neyman

A Note on Repeated Games with Non-Monotonic Value pp. 229-234

Leeat Yariv

Effectivity Functions and Simple Games pp. 235-248

Ton Storcken

A Cooperative Analysis of Covert Collusion in Oligopolistic Industries pp. 249-266

Jingang Zhao

note: Existence of Nash Equilibria for Generalized Games without Upper Semicontinuity pp. 267-273

Paolo Cubiotii

note: On the Finiteness of Stable Sets pp. 275-278

Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen and John Hillas

Volume 26, issue 1, 1997

Automorphisms and Weighted Values pp. 1-10

Guillermo Owen and Francesc Carreras

Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems pp. 11-25

Oscar Volij and Nir Dagan

An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure pp. 27-43

Rene van den Brink

Stability of the Core Mapping in Games with a Countable Set of Players pp. 45-50

Benyamin Shitovitz and Ezra Einy

The Kernel for Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game pp. 51-59

Kensaku Kikuta

The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games pp. 61-73

Vincent Feltkamp and Javier Arin

The Reactive Bargaining Set: Structure, Dynamics and Extension to NTU Games pp. 75-95

Daniel Granot and Michael Maschler

A Marginalistic Value for Monotonic Set Games pp. 97-111

Yukihiko Funaki, Kees Hoede and Harry Aarts

Order of Play in Strategically Equivalent Games in Extensive Form pp. 113-136

Amnon Rapoport

note: On an Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value without the Additivity Axiom pp. 137-141

Andrzej Nowak