Multisided matching games with complementarities

Katerina Sherstyuk

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 4, 489-509

Abstract: The paper considers multisided matching games with transfereable utility using the approach of cooperative game theory. Stable matchings are shown to exist when characteristic functions are supermodular, i.e., agents' abilities to contribute to the value of a coalition are complementary across types. We analyze the structure of the core of supermodular matching games and suggest an algorithm for constructing its extreme payoff vectors.

Keywords: Matching; games; ·; supermodular; functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-12-15
Note: Received February 1997/Final version September 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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