The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets

Ron Holzman ()
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Ron Holzman: Department of Mathematics, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, 32000 Haifa, Israel

International Journal of Game Theory, 2001, vol. 29, issue 4, 543-553

Abstract: The Mas-Colell bargaining set is shown to contain the classical bargaining set for superadditive NTU games satisfying the nonlevelness condition. Without superadditivity this is no longer true, but in the TU case the containment still holds for the closure of the Mas-Colell bargaining set.

Keywords: TU; games; ·; NTU; games; ·; bargaining; sets; ·; containment; relations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-05-04
Note: Received: April 2000/Revised version: November 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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