Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains

Shinji Ohseto ()
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Shinji Ohseto: Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 365-374

Abstract: We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; efficiency; domain restriction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received: July 1999/Final version: April 2000
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