note: On some properties of the -core of games with coalition structure

Takeshi Naitoh () and Akira Nakayama ()
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Takeshi Naitoh: Faculty of Economics, Shiga University, Hikone, Shiga, 522-8522 Japan
Akira Nakayama: Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Fukushima University, Matsukawa, Fukushima, 960-1296 Japan

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 2, 253-255

Abstract: Chang [1991] stated some inclusion relation about kernel, reasonable set, and -core of games with coalition structure. We give counterexamples and modify erroneous results.

Date: 1999-05-17
Note: Received: May 1997/Revised version: January 1999
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