Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies

Sylvain Sorin and Jean-Pierre Beaud ()
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Jean-Pierre Beaud: Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France \langlee-mail: beaud@poly.polytechnique.fr\rangle

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 359-364

Abstract: We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We show: 1) that situation b) is always (weakly) better than a), 2) that it can be strictly better in some cases, 3) that the two cases are equivalent if the long uninformed player has an optimal strategy independent of his own moves.

Keywords: incomplete information; sequence of opponents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received: March 1999/Revised: May 2000
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