Two-person repeated games with finite automata

Abraham Neyman () and Daijiro Okada ()
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Daijiro Okada: Department of Economics, SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 3, 309-325

Abstract: We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on strategies available to a player. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly. Results from the study of zero sum case provide the individually rational payoff levels.

Keywords: repeated games; finite automata (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-11
Note: Received February 1997/revised version March 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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