Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information

Oscar Volij ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 63-79

Abstract: We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; core; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received: September 1998/revised version: June 1999
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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1999)
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