Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information
Oscar Volij ()
Economic theory and game theory from Oscar Volij
We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Core; Common Knowledge. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09-08, Revised 1999-09-15
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory 29, 63--79 (2000)
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Journal Article: Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nid:ovolij:006
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