Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information
Oscar Volij ()
Game Theory and Information from University Library of Munich, Germany
We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core is introduced, that requires credibility from the improvements.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Core; Common Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on PC-TEX; pages: 17
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Journal Article: Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9711001
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