Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information

Oscar Volij ()

Staff General Research Papers Archive from Iowa State University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is considered and an Internally Consistent Core, which requires credibility from the improvements is introduced.

Date: 2000-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory 2000, vol. 29, pp. 63-79

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Related works:
Journal Article: Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information (2000)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1999)
Working Paper: Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:isu:genres:5140

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