Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games

Amit K. Biswas (), G. Ravindran () and T. Parthasarathy ()
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Amit K. Biswas: Indian Statistical Institute, 110, Nelson Manickam Road, Aminjikarai, Madras 600029, India Indian Statistical Institute, 8th Mile Mysore Road, R.V. College Post, Banglore 560059, India Indian Statistical Institute, Math - Stat Division, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India
G. Ravindran: Indian Statistical Institute, 110, Nelson Manickam Road, Aminjikarai, Madras 600029, India Indian Statistical Institute, 8th Mile Mysore Road, R.V. College Post, Banglore 560059, India Indian Statistical Institute, Math - Stat Division, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India
T. Parthasarathy: Indian Statistical Institute, 110, Nelson Manickam Road, Aminjikarai, Madras 600029, India Indian Statistical Institute, 8th Mile Mysore Road, R.V. College Post, Banglore 560059, India Indian Statistical Institute, Math - Stat Division, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi 110016, India

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 1, 22 pages

Abstract: Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known. In this paper we answer affirmatively the necessity for symmetric games. We also prove its equivalence to n specified vectors being imputations and also to the convexity of the lower boundary of the set of all acceptable pay-off vectors of the game. In this paper we establish the equivalence of a condition given by Shapley to the newly evolved condition, thereby give an alternate proof to Shapley's condition.

Keywords: Symmetric game; stable core; lower boundary; specified vectors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-15
Note: Received: January 1997/final version: March 1999
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