Recall in extensive form games

Klaus Ritzberger

International Journal of Game Theory, 1999, vol. 28, issue 1, 69-87

Abstract: This paper considers characterizations of perfect recall in extensive form games. It is shown that perfect recall can be expressed in terms of choices without any reference to infomation sets. When information sets are taken into account, it is decomposable into an ordering of information sets and that players do not forget what they knew nor what they did. Thus, if information sets are partially ordered, then perfect recall is implied by the player's inability to refine her information from the memory.

Keywords: Extensive; form; games; ·; perfect; recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-11
Note: Received: August 1997/final version: September 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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