International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Continuity Properties of Bargaining Solutions pp. 411-25: Hannu Salonen
A Note on the Characterizations of the Compromise Value pp. 427-35: Gert-Jan Otten, Peter Borm and Stef Tijs
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games pp. 437-53: Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme
Bayesian Cooperative Choice of Strategies pp. 455-73: Tatsuro Ichiishi and Adam Idzik
Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games pp. 475-94: Amnon Rapoport and James A Sundali
Economical Experiments: Bayesian Efficient Experimental Design pp. 495-517: Mahmoud El-Gamal and Thomas Palfrey

An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games pp. 269-87: Mark Fey, Richard D McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey
On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games pp. 289-301: Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe and Vernon Smith
Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment pp. 303-27: Glenn Harrison and Kevin McCabe
Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study pp. 329-53: Jan Potters and Frans van Winden
An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections pp. 355-83: Robert Forsythe, Thomas Rietz, Roger Myerson and Robert Weber
Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation pp. 385-406: Arthur Schram and Joep Sonnemans

Isomorphism in 3-Person Games pp. 137-48: Shaoji Xu
Core, Value and Equilibria for Market Games: On a Problem of Aumann and Shapley pp. 149-60: Dan Butnariu and Erich Peter Klement
Canonical Monotone Decompositions of Fractional Stable Matchings pp. 161-76: Hernan G Abeledo, Yosef Blum and Uriel G Rothblum
Mediated Talk pp. 177-88: Ehud Lehrer
The Nakamura Theorem for Coalition Structures of Quota Games pp. 189-98: Rajat Deb, Shlomo Weber and Eyal Winter
On Equilibrium on the Square pp. 199-205: Nicolas Vieille
Conditional Systems Revisited pp. 207-17: Nicolas Vieille
The Kernel/Nucleolus of a Standard Tree Game pp. 219-44: D Granot, M Maschler, G Owen and W.R. Zhu
The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments pp. 245-58: Mamoru Kaneko and Myrna Wooders

A Generalization of the Nash Equilibrium Theorem on Bimatrix Games pp. 1-12: M Seetharama Gowda and Roman Sznajder
The Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Forms pp. 13-34: Bezalel Peleg and Stef Tijs
A Note on Correlated Equilibrium pp. 35-41: Fe S Evangelista and T E S Raghavan
On Quasi-Stable Sets pp. 43-49: Dries Vermeulen, J A M Potters and Mathijs Jansen
Auctions with Interdependent Valuations pp. 51-64: Peter Funk
Equivalence between Bargaining Sets and the Core in Simple Games pp. 65-71: Ezra Einy and David Wettstein
Finding Mixed Strategies with Small Supports in Extensive Form Games pp. 73-92: Daphne Koller and Nimrod Megiddo
Zero-Sum Continuous Games with No Compact Support pp. 93-111: Luciano Mendez-Naya
The Least Square Prenucleolus and the Least Square Nucleolus. Two Values for TU Games Based on the Excess Vector pp. 113-34: Luis M Ruiz, Federico Valenciano and José Zarzuelo

An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives pp. 323-44: Werner Guth
Nash and Strongly Consistent Two-Player Game Forms pp. 345-56: Joseph Abdou
Computing the Nucleolus When the Characteristic Function Is Given Implicitly: A Constraint Generation Approach pp. 357-72: Asa Hallefjord, Reidun Helming and Kurt Jörnsten
Consistency and Monotonicity in Assignment Problems pp. 373-97: Hiroo Sasaki
The Not-Quite Non-atomic Game: Homogeneous Games on Two Measures pp. 399-413: Guillermo Owen

Existence Theorems of Nash Equilibria for Non-cooperative N-Person Games pp. 217-22: Kok-Keong Tan, Jian Yu and Xian-Zhi Yuan
Cheap Play with No Regret pp. 223-37: Bhaskar Chakravorti and John Conley
Games and Cooperation Indices pp. 239-58: Rafel Amer and Francesc Carreras
Perfect Equilibria of a Model of N-Person Noncooperative Bargaining pp. 259-72: Vijay Krishna and Roberto Serrano
A Value for Continuously-Many-Choice Cooperative Games pp. 273-92: Chih-Ru Hsiao
Comparative Static Effects of Number of Bidders and Public Information on Behavior in Second-Price Common Value Auctions pp. 293-319: John Kagel, Dan Levin and Ronald Harstad

Even and Odd Marginal Worth Vectors, Owen's Multilinear Extension and Convex Games pp. 113-26: Carles Rafels and Neus Ybern
Behavior Strategies, Mixed Strategies and Perfect Recall pp. 127-45: Mamoru Kaneko and Jeffrey Kline
Hierarchical Organization Structures and Constraints on Coalition Formation pp. 147-63: Jean Derks and Robert P Gilles
Geometric Versions of Finite Games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Entry Deterrence and a Cyclical Majority Paradox pp. 165-77: Vicki Knoblauch
Alternative Axiomatic Characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf Values pp. 179-86: Vincent Feltkamp
On the Origin of Convention: Evidence from Symmetric Bargaining Games pp. 187-212: John van Huyck, Raymond Battalio, Sondip Mathur, Patsy Van Huyck and Andreas Ortmann

On the Contributions of John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash and Reinhard Selten pp. 3-11: Eric van Damme
The Nucleolus for Cooperative Games with Arbitrary Bounds of Individual Rationality pp. 13-22: Arkady Sobolev
Representation of Finite Action Large Games pp. 23-35: Kali Rath
Two-Person Game Forms Guaranteeing the Stability against Commitment and Delaying Tactics pp. 37-48: Nikolai Kukushkin
Gamma-Component Additive Games pp. 49-56: Jos Potters and Hans Reijnierse
Set-Valued Nonlinear Analogues of the Shapley Value pp. 57-78: Sergei Pechersky and Arkady Sobolev
A Unifying Approach to Existence of Nash Equilibrium pp. 79-94: Erik Balder
The Folk Theorem for Finitely Repeated Games with Mixed Strategies pp. 95-107: Olivier Gossner