Geometric Versions of Finite Games: Prisoner's Dilemma, Entry Deterrence and a Cyclical Majority Paradox

Vicki Knoblauch ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1995, vol. 24, issue 2, 165-77

Abstract: We provide geometric versions of finite, two-person games in the course of proving the following: if a finite, two-person, symmetric game is constant-sum, it is a location game. If it is not constant-sum, it is a location game with a reservation price. Every finite two-person game is a location game with a reservation price and two location sets, one for each player. We then use location games to resolve a cyclical majority paradox, and to analyze a prisoner's dilemma and an entry deterrence game.

Date: 1995
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