International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 29, issue 4, 2001

Replication invariance on NTU games pp. 473-486

Emilio Calvo Ramón, Iñaki Garci´a and José Zarzuelo

Stability in coalition formation games pp. 487-494

Antonio Romero-Medina and Katari´na Cechlárová

When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis pp. 495-515

Ken Clark, Stephen Kay and Martin Sefton

The Owen value values friendship pp. 517-532

Gerard Hamiache

On the optimality of a simple strategy for searching graphs pp. 533-542

Shmuel Gal

The comparability of the classical and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets pp. 543-553

Ron Holzman

Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility pp. 555-569

Johan Karlander and Kimmo Eriksson

Evolutionarily stable sets pp. 571-595

Karl Schlag and Dieter Balkenborg

Axiomatizations of the core on the universal domain and other natural domains pp. 597-623

Peter Sudhölter and Yan-An Hwang

Volume 29, issue 3, 2000

Two-person repeated games with finite automata pp. 309-325

Abraham Neyman and Daijiro Okada

Population monotonic solutions on convex games pp. 327-338

Toru Hokari

Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium pp. 339-357

Licun Xue

Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies pp. 359-364

Sylvain Sorin and Jean-Pierre Beaud

Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains pp. 365-374

Shinji Ohseto

Correlated equilibria of games with many players pp. 375-389

Hans Keiding and Bezalel Peleg

Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies pp. 391-412

Anton Stefanescu

First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness pp. 413-432

Gustavo E. Rodriguez

Player splitting in extensive form games pp. 433-450

Dries Vermeulen, Mathijs Jansen and Andrés Perea

Value theory without symmetry pp. 451-468

Ori Haimanko

Volume 29, issue 2, 2000

The survival value of assuming others to be rational pp. 147-163

Johan Stennek

Relative impatience determines preference between contract bargaining and repeated bargaining pp. 165-176

Diane J. Reyniers

The multichoice consistent value pp. 177-188

Esther GutiÊrrez, Emilio Calvo Ramón and Juan Carlos Santos

Independent mistakes in large games pp. 189-209

Ady Pauzner

Characterization of optimal strategies in matrix games with convexity properties pp. 211-227

Tadeusz Radzik

Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty pp. 229-240

Ruqu Wang

Inheritance of properties in communication situations pp. 241-268

Marco Slikker

Loss aversion equilibrium pp. 269-287

Jonathan Shalev

Games with finite resources pp. 289-303

Thomas S. Ferguson and Costis Melolidakis

Volume 29, issue 1, 2000

Weighted weak semivalues pp. 1-9

Emilio Calvo Ramón and Juan Carlos Santos

Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games pp. 11-22

Amit K. Biswas, G. Ravindran and T. Parthasarathy

The selectope for cooperative games pp. 23-38

Jean Derks, Hans Haller and Hans Peters

A characterization of vNM-stable sets for linear production games pp. 39-61

Joachim RosenmØller and Benyamin Shitovitz

Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information pp. 63-79

Oscar Volij

Dynamics and axiomatics of the equal area bargaining solution pp. 81-92

Emilio Calvo Ramón and Hans Peters

A consistent value for games with n players and r alternatives pp. 93-99

Edward M. Bolger

Cumbersome coordination in repeated games pp. 101-118

Horst Raff and David Schmidt

note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power pp. 119-126

Mehmet Bac

note: An alternative characterization of the weighted Banzhaf value pp. 127-132

Andrzej Nowak and Tadeusz Radzik

note: The nucleolus is not aggregate-monotonic on the domain of convex games pp. 133-137

Toru Hokari

note: The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus pp. 139-142

Elisenda Molina and Juan Tejada

Volume 28, issue 4, 1999

The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individuals pp. 447-463

Avner Shaked, Ilan Eshel and Emilia Sansone

Convergence of aspirations and (partial) cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma pp. 465-488

Fernando Vega-Redondo and Frederic Palomino

Multisided matching games with complementarities pp. 489-509

Katerina Sherstyuk

Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems pp. 511-520

Youngsub Chun

Characterizations of a multi-choice value pp. 521-532

José Zarzuelo, Marco Slikker and Flip Klijn

The effect of punishment duration of trigger strategies and quasifinite continuation probabilities for Prisoners' Dilemmas pp. 533-546

Michael A. Jones

An axiomatic approach to the concept of interaction among players in cooperative games pp. 547-565

Marc Roubens and Michel Grabisch

The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game pp. 567-583

Marilda Sotomayor

Computing the NTU-Shapley value of NTU-games defined by multiple objective linear programs pp. 585-597

Kim Allan Andersen and Mikael Lind

Proper rationalizability and backward induction pp. 599-615

Frank Schuhmacher

Volume 28, issue 3, 1999

Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge pp. 263-300

Robert Aumann

Interactive epistemology II: Probability pp. 301-314

Robert Aumann

Hypothetical knowledge and counterfactual reasoning pp. 315-330

Joseph Halpern

The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge pp. 331-365

John Geanakoplos, Moshe Y. Vardi (**),, Joseph Halpern and Ronald Fagin

The difference between common knowledge of formulas and sets pp. 367-384

Robert Samuel Simon

Approximate common knowledge revisited pp. 385-408

Stephen Morris

How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information pp. 409-434

Giacomo Bonanno and Klaus Nehring

How canonical is the canonical model? A comment on Aumann's interactive epistemology pp. 435-442

Aviad Heifetz

Volume 28, issue 2, 1999

The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach pp. 157-171

Yukihiko Funaki and Takehiko Yamato

Weighted nucleoli pp. 173-187

Hans Haller and Jean Derks

Fictitious play in coordination games pp. 189-197

Aner Sela and Dorothea Herreiner

The speed of rational learning pp. 199-210

Alvaro Sandroni and Rann Smorodinsky

Prosperity properties of TU-games pp. 211-227

J. R. G. van Gellekom, J. A. M. Potters and Hans Reijnierse

On the bargaining set, kernel and core of superadditive games pp. 229-240

Tamás Solymosi

Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game pp. 241-252

Claudia Keser and Roy Gardner

note: On some properties of the -core of games with coalition structure pp. 253-255

Takeshi Naitoh and Akira Nakayama

Volume 28, issue 1, 1999

The core of a class of non-atomic games which arise in economic applications pp. 1-14

Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz and Ezra Einy

The Folk theorem for dominance solutions pp. 15-24

Alexander Vasin

The existence of TU -core in normal form games pp. 25-34

Jingang Zhao

"Costless" regulation of monopolies with large entry cost: A game theoretic approach pp. 35-52

Moshe Bar Niv and Israel Zang

Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games pp. 53-68

Vincent Vannetelbosch and P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Recall in extensive form games pp. 69-87

Klaus Ritzberger

Equilibrium cooperation in two-stage games: Experimental evidence pp. 89-109

Douglas Davis and Charles Holt

Evidence based rules and learning in symmetric normal-form games pp. 111-130

Dale Stahl

Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study pp. 131-152

Nick Feltovich and John Duffy