The survival value of assuming others to be rational

Johan Stennek ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000, vol. 29, issue 2, 147-163

Abstract: I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality to survive, it is necessary and sufficient that the rational procedure respects the attraction principle. That is, when a rational agent eliminates a strictly dominated action A, he should only increase the choice probability of the actions actually dominating A and not change the choice probability of other undominated actions. The attraction principle sharpens gametheoretic predictions. Attraction effects have been verified in psychological experiments.

Keywords: Evolutionary; psychology; ·; rationality; ·; beliefs (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-07-12
Note: Received: November 1997/Final version: January 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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