International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2026

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 44, issue 4, 2015

Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes pp. 785-813

Federico Quartieri and Ryusuke Shinohara

Dynamic multilateral markets pp. 815-833

Arnold Polanski and Emiliya Lazarova

Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems pp. 835-868

Gustavo Bergantiños and Juan Vidal-Puga

On equilibrium refinements in supermodular games pp. 869-890

Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau and Richard McLean

Axioms of invariance for TU-games pp. 891-902

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila and Philippe Solal

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games pp. 903-932

Heinrich Nax and Bary Pradelski

A folk theorem for the one-dimensional spatial bargaining model pp. 933-948

Seok-ju Cho and John Duggan

Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price” pp. 949-991

Kalyan Chatterjee and Kaustav Das

Pillage games with multiple stable sets pp. 993-1013

Simon MacKenzie, Manfred Kerber and Colin Rowat

Information, interaction and memory pp. 1015-1032

Virginie Masson

Multimarket contact under demand fluctuations pp. 1033-1048

Tadashi Sekiguchi

Erratum to: Voting power and proportional representation of voters pp. 1049-1049

Artyom Jelnov and Yair Tauman

Volume 44, issue 3, 2015

Network topology and equilibrium existence in weighted network congestion games pp. 515-541

Igal Milchtaich

Incentive compatible market design with applications pp. 543-569

M. Bumin Yenmez

All-pay 2 $$\times $$ × 2 Hex: a multibattle contest with complementarities pp. 571-597

Dan Kovenock, Sudipta Sarangi and Matt Wiser

Dynamic matching and bargaining with heterogeneous deadlines pp. 599-629

Sjaak Hurkens and Nir Vulkan

On restricted bargaining sets pp. 631-645

Javier Hervés-Estévez and Emma Moreno-García

Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs pp. 647-666

Ron Holzman and Dov Monderer

Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning pp. 667-699

Georgios Chasparis, Jeff Shamma and Anders Rantzer

Information sharing networks in linear quadratic games pp. 701-732

Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri

Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games pp. 733-760

Stéphane Gonzalez and Michel Grabisch

On the number of positions in chess without promotion pp. 761-767

Stefan Steinerberger

An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders pp. 769-784

Adolphus Talman and Zaifu Yang

Volume 44, issue 2, 2015

Non-existence of equilibria in simultaneous auctions with a common budget-constraint pp. 253-274

Gagan Ghosh

Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value pp. 275-293

Koji Yokote

Roughly weighted hierarchical simple games pp. 295-319

Ali Hameed and Arkadii Slinko

Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors pp. 321-346

Cy Maor and Eilon Solan

Search games on a network with travelling and search costs pp. 347-365

Vic Baston and Kensaku Kikuta

Core deviation minimizing auctions pp. 367-376

Isa Hafalir and Hadi Yektas

The conic property for vector measure market games pp. 377-386

Omer Edhan

Contests with endogenous entry pp. 387-424

Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao and Jingfeng Lu

A preference change or a perception change? A comment on Dietrich and List pp. 425-431

Marek Hudik

Equilibrium selection via replicator dynamics in $$2 \times 2$$ 2 × 2 coordination games pp. 433-448

Boyu Zhang and Josef Hofbauer

On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games pp. 449-471

René Brink, René Levínský and Miroslav Zelený

Stable sets in majority pillage games pp. 473-486

James Jordan and David Obadia

A note on external angles of the core of convex TU games, marginal worth vectors and the Weber set pp. 487-498

Sergei Pechersky

Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise pp. 499-514

Katsuhiko Aiba

Volume 44, issue 1, 2015

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of assignment markets pp. 1-15

Francesc Llerena, Marina Núñez and Carles Rafels

The emergence of cooperation through leadership pp. 17-36

Shota Fujishima

On the outcome equivalence of backward induction and extensive form rationalizability pp. 37-59

Aviad Heifetz and Andrés Perea

Prisoners’ other Dilemma pp. 61-81

Matthias Blonski and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Time consistent Markov policies in dynamic economies with quasi-hyperbolic consumers pp. 83-112

Łukasz Balbus, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

On loss aversion, level-1 reasoning, and betting pp. 113-133

Ido Erev, Sharon Gilat-Yihyie, Davide Marchiori and Doron Sonsino

The asymptotic core, nucleolus and Shapley value of smooth market games with symmetric large players pp. 135-151

Avishay Aiche, Anna Rubinchik and Benyamin Shitovitz

Mostly calibrated pp. 153-163

Yossi Feinberg and Nicolas Lambert

The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games pp. 165-193

Dieter Balkenborg, Josef Hofbauer and Christoph Kuzmics

Strategy-proofness versus symmetry in economies with an indivisible good and money pp. 195-207

Miki Kato, Shinji Ohseto and Shohei Tamura

Contracts vs. preferences over colleagues in matching pp. 209-223

Francis Flanagan

The single crossing conditions for incomplete preferences pp. 225-251

Nikolai Kukushkin

Volume 43, issue 4, 2014

Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation pp. 721-745

Abhimanyu Khan

Voting power and proportional representation of voters pp. 747-766

Artyom Jelnov and Yair Tauman

Repeated games of incomplete information with large sets of states pp. 767-789

Fedor Sandomirskiy

Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals pp. 791-819

Ron Lavi and Ella Segev

Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games pp. 821-843

Julio González-Díaz and Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez

Linking the Kar and folk solutions through a problem separation property pp. 845-870

Christian Trudeau

A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes pp. 871-879

Jesús Getán, Jesús Montes and Carles Rafels

Utility proportional beliefs pp. 881-902

Christian Bach and Andrés Perea

Cognitive hierarchies in adaptive play pp. 903-924

Abhimanyu Khan and Ronald Peeters

Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems pp. 925-943

Ana Mauleon, Elena Molis, Vincent Vannetelbosch and Wouter Vergote

Non-existence of subgame-perfect $$\varepsilon $$ ε -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon pp. 945-951

János Flesch, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eran Shmaya, Eilon Solan and Koos Vrieze

The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification pp. 953-973

Akira Okada

Existence of Edgeworth and competitive equilibria and fuzzy cores in coalition production economies pp. 975-990

Jiuqiang Liu and Xiaodong Liu

Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium pp. 991-1008

Zacharias Maniadis

Volume 43, issue 3, 2014

Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders pp. 487-514

Vlad Mares and Jeroen Swinkels

Contests with productive effort pp. 515-523

Ron Siegel

A framework for robustness to ambiguity of higher-order beliefs pp. 525-550

Ronald Stauber

A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game pp. 551-577

Daniel Carvalho and Luis Santos-Pinto

Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped pp. 579-597

Vikram Manjunath

False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives pp. 599-618

Liad Wagman and Vincent Conitzer

The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare pp. 619-627

Anirban Kar and Arunava Sen

Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly pp. 629-658

Rabah Amir and Giuseppe De Feo

On $${\alpha }$$ α -roughly weighted games pp. 659-692

Josep Freixas and Sascha Kurz

Mechanism design to the budget constrained buyer: a canonical mechanism approach pp. 693-719

Naoki Kojima

Volume 43, issue 2, 2014

Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma pp. 245-267

Kfir Eliaz and Roberto Serrano

LIM is not slim pp. 269-281

Alex Fink, Aviezri Fraenkel and Carlos Santos

Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games pp. 283-350

Igal Milchtaich

Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players pp. 351-368

Rene van den Brink, Gerard Laan and Valeri Vasil’ev

Ranking asymmetric auctions pp. 369-393

Arieh Gavious and Yizhaq Minchuk

On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria pp. 395-402

Carlos Pimienta and Jianfei Shen

Monotonic models and cycles pp. 403-413

José Rodrigues-Neto

The combinatorial game theory of well-tempered scoring games pp. 415-438

Will Johnson

The extended serial correspondence on a rich preference domain pp. 439-454

Eun Jeong Heo

Information acquisition interactions in two-player quadratic games pp. 455-485

Antonio Jimenez-Martinez

Volume 43, issue 1, 2014

Collusion, quarrel, and the Banzhaf value pp. 1-11

André Casajus

How long to Pareto efficiency? pp. 13-24

Yakov Babichenko

When is tit-for-tat unbeatable? pp. 25-36

Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper

On extensions of the core and the anticore of transferable utility games pp. 37-63

Jean Derks, Hans Peters and Peter Sudhölter

Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: an experimental test of the absentminded driver “paradox” pp. 65-88

Maria Levati, Matthias Uhl and Ro'i Zultan

Subgame perfect equilibria in stopping games pp. 89-135

Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi

Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory pp. 137-143

Daniel Monte

A savings paradox for integer-valued gambling strategies pp. 145-151

Jason Teutsch

A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model pp. 153-168

Kentaro Hatsumi, Dolors Berga and Shigehiro Serizawa

Poor convexity and Nash equilibria in games pp. 169-192

Tadeusz Radzik

Countable spaces and common priors pp. 193-213

Ziv Hellman

Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire pp. 215-244

Cuihong Fan, Byoung Jun and Elmar Wolfstetter