“Procedural” values for cooperative games

Marcin Malawski ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 1, 305-324

Abstract: This paper introduces a new notion of a “procedural” value for cooperative TU games. A procedural value is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing marginal contributions to coalitions formed by players joining in random order. We consider procedures under which players can only share their marginal contributions with their predecessors in the ordering, and study the set of all resulting values. The most prominent procedural value is, of course, the Shapley value obtaining under the simplest procedure of every player just retaining his entire marginal contribution. But different sharing rules lead to other interesting values, including the “egalitarian solution” and the Nowak and Radzik “solidarity value”. All procedural values are efficient, symmetric and linear. Moreover, it is shown that these properties together with two very natural monotonicity postulates characterize the class of procedural values. Some possible modifications and generalizations are also discussed. In particular, it is shown that dropping one of monotonicity axioms is equivalent to allowing for sharing marginal contributions with both predecessors and successors in the ordering. Copyright The Author(s) 2013

Keywords: Cooperative game; Procedure; Value; Efficiency; Weak monotonicity; Coalitional monotonicity; Extended procedure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:42:y:2013:i:1:p:305-324

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0361-7

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().