Voting power and proportional representation of voters

Artyom Jelnov and Yair Tauman ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 747-766

Abstract: We prove that for the proportional representative election system if parties’ sizes are uniformly distributed on the simplex, the expected ratio of a party size to its political power, measured by the Shapley–Shubik index, converges to $$1$$ 1 , as the number $$n$$ n of parties increases indefinitely. The rate of convergence is high and it is of the magnitude of $$\frac{1}{n}$$ 1 n . Empirical evidence from the Netherlands elections supports our result. A comparison with the Banzhaf index is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index; Voting power; Voting systems; Proportional representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Voting Power and Proportional Representation of Voters (2012)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0400-z

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