Voting Power and Proportional Representation of Voters

Yair Tauman (amty21@gmail.com) and Artyom Jelnov

No 12-04, Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Our paper provides a justi cation for the proportional representative (PR) election system for politically diversi ed societies. We employ the Shapley value concept to measure the political power of parties in a parliament. We prove that for the PR system if parties' size add up to 1 and is uniformly distributed, the expected ratio of a party size to its political power converges to 1, and the variance decreases to 0 as the number of parties increases. The rate of convergence is high. An empirical evidence from the Netherlands elections supports our result. Using the Shapley-Owen index we obtain similar result (this time numerically only) for a voting model that takes into account ideological differences between parties and voters.

Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/economics/resear ... 12/Jelnov-Tauman.pdf First version, 2012 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Voting power and proportional representation of voters (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nys:sunysb:12-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from Stony Brook University, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (james.gluzman@stonybrook.edu).