Monotonic core solutions: beyond Young’s theorem

J. Arin ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2013, vol. 42, issue 2, 325-337

Abstract: Young’s theorem implies that every core concept violates monotonicity. In this paper, we investigate when such a violation of monotonicity by a given core concept is justified. We introduce a new monotonicity property for core concepts. We pose several open questions for this new property. The open questions arise because the most important core concepts (the nucleolus and the per capita nucleolus) do not satisfy the property even in the class of convex games. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Monotonicity; Core; TU games; Per capita Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0368-8

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