International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Absolutely expedient imitative behavior pp. 475-492: Antonio Morales
On existence of undominated pure strategy Nash equilibria in anonymous nonatomic games: a generalization pp. 493-498: Giulio Codognato and Sayantan Ghosal
Lower semicontinuity for approximate social Nash equilibria pp. 499-509: Jacqueline Morgan and Roberto Raucci
Evolutionary insights on the willingness to communicate pp. 511-526: Sjaak Hurkens and Karl Schlag
Noncooperative selection of the core pp. 527-540: Huibin Yan
Control costs and potential functions for spatial games pp. 541-561: Richard Baron, Jacques Durieu, Hans Haller and Philippe Solal
An axiomatization of the inner core pp. 563-569: Geoffroy de Clippel
Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs pp. 571-591: Taiji Furusawa and Quan Wen
Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations pp. 593-607: Toru Hokari and Anita Gellekom
Games with frequency-dependent stage payoffs pp. 609-620: Reinoud Joosten, Thomas Brenner and Ulrich Witt

Voting for voters: the unanimity case pp. 155-202: Jonathan Shalev, Daniel Granot and Michael Maschler
The game for the speed of convergence in repeated games of incomplete information pp. 203-222: Irit Nowik and Shmuel Zamir
Perfect equilibrium and lexicographic beliefs pp. 229-243: Srihari Govindan and Tilman Klumpp
The prediction of sequences pp. 245-251: David Blackwell
Approachability in infinite dimensional spaces pp. 253-268: Ehud Lehrer
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers pp. 269-283: Marilda Sotomayor
On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance pp. 285-319: Hadiza Moussa Saley and Bernard De Meyer

The bargaining set of four-person balanced games pp. 1-11: Tamás Solymosi
A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles pp. 13-18: Antonio Quesada
Marginal cost price rule for homogeneous cost functions pp. 19-28: Ori Haimanko
A note on NTU convexity pp. 29-37: Ruud Hendrickx, Judith Timmer and Peter Borm
On computational complexity of membership test in flow games and linear production games pp. 39-45: Shanfeng Zhu, Xiaotie Deng, Maocheng Cai and Qizhi Fang
Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations pp. 47-67: Marcin Malawski
On the impact of low-balling: Experimental results in asymmetric auctions pp. 69-89: Paul Pezanis-Christou
Correlated equilibrium payoffs and public signalling in absorbing games pp. 91-121: Eilon Solan and Rakesh V. Vohra
Stability of the Cournot process - experimental evidence pp. 123-136: Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann and Jörg Oechssler
Playing with mixed strategies on infinite sets pp. 137-150: Benedikt Löwe

Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs pp. 453-478: Geir Asheim
Stay-in-a-set games pp. 479-490: Piercesare Secchi and William D. Sudderth
N-Person stochastic games with upper semi-continuous payoffs pp. 491-502: Piercesare Secchi and William D. Sudderth
On bargaining partner selection when communication is restricted pp. 503-515: Antoni Calvó-Armengol
An epistemic analysis of the Harsanyi transformation pp. 517-525: Harborne Stuart and Hong Hu
Best response dynamics for role games pp. 527-538: Ulrich Berger
Generalized genus sequences for misère octal games pp. 539-556: D. T. Allemang
Maximal stable sets of two-player games pp. 557-566: Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson
Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations pp. 567-599: S. H. Tijs, Maurice Koster, E. Molina and Yves Sprumont
Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games pp. 601-609: Theo Driessen and Elena Yanovskaya

An axiomatization of the Shapley value using a fairness property pp. 309-319: Rene van den Brink
Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation pp. 321-350: Dan Levin and James Smith
Closedness under Hart-Mas Colell reduction pp. 351-357: Chih Chang and Yan-An Hwang
The splitting game and applications pp. 359-376: Rida Laraki
Linear and symmetric allocation methods for partially defined cooperative games pp. 377-404: David Housman
Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions pp. 405-419: Ori Haimanko, Aner Sela, Ram Orzach and Ezra Einy
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems pp. 421-435: Bettina Klaus and Eiichi Miyagawa
Decentralized versus collective bargaining - An experimental study pp. 437-448: S. Berninghaus, H.-J. Ramser, Werner Güth and R. Lechler
Note Equilibrium payoffs in stochastic games of incomplete information: the general symmetric case pp. 449-452: Julien Geitner

On the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced game pp. 147-165: Jens Hougaard, Lars Thorlund-Petersen and Bezalel Peleg
An axiomatization of the modified Banzhaf Coleman index pp. 167-176: M. J. Albizuri
Assignment games with stable core pp. 177-185: T. E. S. Raghavan and Tamás Solymosi
Egalitarian solutions in the core pp. 187-193: Javier Arin and Elena Inarra
The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the -core pp. 195-207: Koji Takamiya
Inferior players in simple games pp. 209-220: Mika Widgrén and Stefan Napel
3-player repeated games with lack of information on one side pp. 221-245: Jérôme Renault
Some results related to the Harsanyi-Shapley solution pp. 247-258: Yan-An Hwang (*), and Chih Chang
Characterization of correlated equilibria in stochastic games pp. 259-277: Eilon Solan
Associated consistency and Shapley value pp. 279-289: Gerard Hamiache
On the existence and efficiency of the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set in a n-player prisoners' dilemma pp. 291-307: Noritsugu Nakanishi

The generation of formulas held in common knowledge pp. 1-18: Robert Samuel Simon
Flexibility of disagreement actions in negotiations pp. 19-39: Quan Wen and Taiji Furusawa
Repeated communication through the mechanism pp. 41-60: Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille
A value for mixed action-set games pp. 61-78: Emilio Calvo Ramón and Juan Carlos Santos
On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game pp. 79-98: Jeroen Kuipers, Ulrich Faigle and Walter Kern
On the NP-completeness of finding an optimal strategy in games with common payoffs pp. 99-106: Francis Chu and Joseph Halpern
Almost global convergence to p-dominant equilibrium pp. 107-116: William Sandholm
The semireactive bargaining set of a cooperative game pp. 117-139: Peter Sudhölter and Jos A. M. Potters
On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities pp. 141-146: Carsten Helm