Consistent and covariant solutions for TU games
Elena Yanovskaya
International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 485-500
Abstract:
One of the important properties characterizing cooperative game solutions is consistency. This notion establishes connections between the solution vectors of a cooperative game and those of its reduced game. The last one is obtained from the initial game by removing one or more players and by giving them the payoffs according to a specific principle (e.g. a proposed payoff vector). Consistency of a solution means that the restriction of a solution payoff vector of the initial game to any coalition belongs to the solution set of the corresponding reduced game. There are several definitions of the reduced games (cf., e.g., the survey of T. Driessen [2]) based on some intuitively acceptable characteristics. In the paper some natural properties of reduced games are formulated, and general forms of the reduced games possessing some of them are given. The efficient, anonymous, covariant TU cooperative game solutions satisfying the consistency property with respect to any reduced game are described. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004
Keywords: Cooperative TU game; value; consistency; reduced game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400172 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:485-500
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s001820400172
Access Statistics for this article
International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel
More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().