On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria

Robert Nau (), Sabrina Gomez Canovas and Pierre Hansen

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 443-453

Abstract: It is well known that the set of correlated equilibrium distributions of an n-player noncooperative game is a convex polytope that includes all the Nash equilibrium distributions. We demonstrate an elementary yet surprising result: the Nash equilibria all lie on the boundary of the polytope. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: C720 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820300162 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:443-453

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s001820300162

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().