Evolutionary and asymptotic stability in symmetric multi-player games

Maciej Bukowski and Jacek Miekisz ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 33, issue 1, 54 pages

Abstract: We provide a classification of symmetric three-player games with two strategies and investigate evolutionary and asymptotic stability (in the replicator dynamics) of their Nash equilibria. We discuss similarities and differences between two-player and multi-player games. In particular, we construct examples which exhibit a novel behavior not found in two-player games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: multi-player games; evolutionarily stable strategies; asymptotic stability; replicator dynamics; risk-dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:41-54

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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400183

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