Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 545-560

Abstract: We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency, independence of irrelevant objects, and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.” Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: D63; D70; Indivisible objects; Resource-monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (2003)
Working Paper: Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (2003)
Working Paper: Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:545-560

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DOI: 10.1007/s001820400177

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