Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

Lars Ehlers and Bettina Klaus ()

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Keywords: indivisible objects; resource-monotonicity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18
Date: 2003-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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http://pareto.uab.es/wp/2003/56603.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems (2004)
Working Paper: Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (2003)
Working Paper: Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:566.03

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