Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon and Vincent Vannetelbosch

International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, vol. 32, issue 4, 519-531

Abstract: We revisit n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. As a novelty, we introduce fuzzy play and a matching device. By fuzzy play we mean that each player does not choose which pure strategy to play, but instead chooses a nonempty subset of his strategy set that he submits to the matching device. The matching device is a very simple one. It randomly selects a match if possible, and it selects randomly some strategy belonging to the strategy set sent by each player otherwise. That is, it does not impose that the best alternatives are matched. Using the concepts of perfect Nash equilibrium and of trembling-hand perfect rationalizability, we show that players coordinate directly on the Pareto optimal outcome. This implies that they neither use the option of fuzzy play, nor make use of the matching device. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Keywords: C72; C78; D61; coordination games; coordination failures; rationalizability; matching devices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001820400174 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2004)
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2003)
Working Paper: Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Faulures (2002)
Working Paper: Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures (2001)
Working Paper: Fuzzy Play, Matching Devices and Coordination Failures (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:519-531

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s001820400174

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().