International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

From:
Springer
Game Theory Society
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Olga Nikolajevna Bondareva, 1937-1991 pp. 309-12: Joachim Rosenmuller
On the Cookie Game pp. 313-24: J Propp and D Ullman
Reduced Games, Consistency, and the Core pp. 325-34: K Tadenuma
The Strength of a Little Perfection pp. 335-55: Ehud Kalai and Alejandro Neme
Filtrations, Values and Voting Discipline pp. 357-76: F Carreras
Asymptotically Optimal Strategies in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information pp. 377-392: M Heuer
Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information pp. 393-418: M Plum
Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games pp. 419-27: Michel Le Breton, G Owen and Shlomo Weber
Set-Theoretic Equivalence of Extensive-Form Games pp. 429-47: Giacomo Bonanno

Pure Strategy Equilibria in a Class of Systems Defense Games pp. 195-210: Peter Coughlin
On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring pp. 211-26: Ehud Lehrer
The Ordered Field Property and a Finite Algorithm for the Nash Bargaining Solution pp. 227-36: Mamoru Kaneko
Mathematical Kayles pp. 237-46: William L Sibert and John H Conway
On the Existence of Equilibria in Generalized Games pp. 247-54: Guoqiang Tian
Allocation Rules for Hypergraph Communication Situations pp. 255-68: Anne van den Nouweland, Peter Borm and Stef Tijs
A Remark on the Princess and Monster Search Game pp. 269-76: Andrey Garnaev
Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach pp. 277-93: Robert P Gilles, Guillermo Owen and Rene van den Brink
On Existence of Stable and Efficient Outcomes in Games with Public and Private Objectives pp. 295-303: Nikolai Kukushkin

Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games pp. 95-108: Akira Okada
Random Order Coalition Structure Values pp. 109-27: Richard McLean
Global Games pp. 129-47: Itzhak Gilboa and Ehud Lehrer
An Improved Algorithm for Finding Saddlepoints of Two-Person Zero-Sum Games pp. 149-59: Christopher C Byrne and Leonid N Vaserstein
Closed Covers of Compact Convex Polyhedra pp. 161-69: Tatsuro Ichiishi and Adam Idzik
The Equilibria of a Multiple Object Game pp. 171-82: Jingang Zhao
On the Symmetric and Weighted Shapley Values pp. 183-90: Youngsub Chun

Bisection Property of the Kernel pp. 1-11: Chih Chang
On the Strong Monotonicity of Power Indices pp. 13-22: Emanuela Sagonti
Saddle Point Theorems pp. 23-32: Tadeusz Radzik
Optimal Strategies for the Uniformed Player pp. 33-51: Martin Heuer
On Non-transferable Utility Games with Coalition Structure pp. 53-63: Eyal Winter
Games of Bounded Deviation, Additivizations of Games and Asymptotic Martingales pp. 65-90: Thomas E Armstrong

On Finding the Nucleolus of an N-Person Cooperative Game pp. 329-38: Jayaram K Sankaran
An Axiomatization of the Weighted NTU Value pp. 339-51: Anat Levy and Richard McLean
Quasi-values on Subspaces pp. 353-63: Itzhak Gilboa and Dov Monderer
An Axiomatization of the Nucleolus pp. 365-73: Jos A M Potters
On a Duel with Time Lag and Arbitrary Accuracy Functions pp. 375-405: Tadashi Kurisu
A Weak Monotonicity Property of the Nucleolus pp. 407-11: Lin Zhou
Characterization of Cores of Assignment Games pp. 413-20: Thomas Quint
On the Convexity of Communication Games pp. 421-30: Anne van den Nouweland and Peter Borm
Internal Correlation in Repeated Games pp. 431-56: Ehud Lehrer

Perfect Equilibria in Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining pp. 237-67: Kalyan Chatterjee and Larry Samuelson
Strategy Additions and Equilibrium Selections pp. 269-76: Larry Samuelson
Limiting Distributions of the Number of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in N-Person Games pp. 277-86: Imelda Yeung Powers
How Characteristic Are Characteristic Functions? pp. 287-99: Van Kolpin
A Local Theory of Cooperative Games pp. 301-24: Makoto Yano

The Stability Set of Voting Games: Classification and Genericity Results pp. 111-27: Michel Le Breton and Maurice Salles
Entropy Control Costs and Entropic Equilibria pp. 129-38: Dale Stahl
Comparative Cooperative Game Theory pp. 139-52: T Ichiishi
The Egalitarian Solution and Reduced Game Properties in Convex Games pp. 153-69: Bhaskar Dutta
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments pp. 171-90: Benny Moldovanu
Nash Equilibria of n-Player Repeated Games with Semi-standard Information pp. 191-217: Ehud Lehrer
Cores and Large Cores When Population Varies pp. 219-32: Herve Moulin

NP-Completeness of Some Problems Concerning Voting Games pp. 1-9: Kislaya Prasad and J S Kelly
A Remark on Myerson's Concept of Proper Equilibrium pp. 11-16: I Garcia Jurado and J M Prada Sanchez
Values for Two-Stage Games: Another View of the Shapley Axioms pp. 17-31: A Beja and Itzhak Gilboa
On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games pp. 33-44: Kaushik Basu
Monotonicity of the Core and Value in Dynamic Cooperative Games pp. 45-57: E C Rosenthal
"Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties pp. 59-89: John Nachbar
Threat Bargaining Games with a Variable Population pp. 91-100: Sajal Lahiri
Finite Approximations to a Zero-Sum Game with Incomplete Information pp. 101-06: J W Mamer and K E Schilling