"Eventually Revealing" Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

Victor C Domansky and Victoria L Kreps

International Journal of Game Theory, 1994, vol. 23, issue 2, 89-99

Abstract: We consider two person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side given by two 2x2-matrices A[superscript 1] and A[superscript 2] for which val [pA[superscript 1][plus](1-p)A[superscript 2]]=p valA[superscript 1][plus](1-p)valA[superscript 2]. Using the approach developed by Heuer [1991] we give the explicit solution for all such finitely repeated games. It provides a supplement to the recent results on the limiting behavior of the value for these games (see Mertens, Sorin and Zamir [1990], De Meyer [1989], [1993]).

Date: 1994
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