A Value for Games with n Players and r Alternatives

Edward M Bolger

International Journal of Game Theory, 1993, vol. 22, issue 4, 319-34

Abstract: We study value theory for a class of games called games with n players and r alternatives. In these games, each of the n players must choose one and only one of the r alternatives. A linear, efficient value is obtained using three characterizations, two of which are axiomatic. This value yields as a priori evaluation for each player relative to each alternative.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:4:p:319-34

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