A Conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on Competitive Outcomes in the Cores of NTU Market Games

Cheng-Zhong Qin ()

International Journal of Game Theory, 1993, vol. 22, issue 4, 335-44

Abstract: It is shown that for every NTU market game, there is a market that represents the game whose competitive payoff vectors completely fill up the inner core of the game. It is also shown that for every NTU market game and for any point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has the given inner core point as its unique competitive payoff vector. The results prove a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik.

Date: 1993
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