International Journal of Game Theory

1983 - 2025

Current editor(s): Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

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Springer
Game Theory Society
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Volume 49, issue 4, 2020

Limits of price competition: cost asymmetry and imperfect information pp. 913-932

Sneha Bakshi

Existence and optimality of Cournot–Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part pp. 933-951

Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Ludovic Julien and Simone Tonin

Stability of the merger-to-monopoly and a core concept for partition function games pp. 953-973

Parkash Chander

Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game? pp. 975-1002

Hiromasa Takahashi, Toru Takemoto and Akihiro Suzuki

Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence pp. 1003-1043

Miguel Fonseca, Francesco Giovannoni and Miltiadis Makris

A strategic justification of the Talmud rule based on lower and upper bounds pp. 1045-1057

Juan Moreno-Ternero, Min-Hung Tsay and Chun-Hsien Yeh

On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals pp. 1059-1080

Bettina Klaus and Panos Protopapas

Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders pp. 1081-1103

Toshihiro Tsuchihashi

Should I remember more than you? Best responses to factored strategies pp. 1105-1124

René Levínský, Abraham Neyman and Miroslav Zelený

On games without approximate equilibria pp. 1125-1128

Yehuda Levy

A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games pp. 1129-1142

Ghislain-Herman Demeze-Jouatsa

Non-emptiness of the alpha-core: sufficient and necessary conditions pp. 1143-1153

Achille Basile and Vincenzo Scalzo

Volume 49, issue 3, 2020

Bill Sandholm in Memoriam pp. 673-680

Larry Samuelson and Jörgen Weibull

Unilaterally competitive games with more than two players pp. 681-697

Takuya Iimura

Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies pp. 699-710

Eleonora Braggion, Nicola Gatti, Roberto Lucchetti, Tuomas Sandholm and Bernhard von Stengel

Common belief in future and restricted past rationality pp. 711-747

Rubén Becerril-Borja and Andrés Perea

Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests pp. 749-771

Aner Sela

Mergers and acquisitions with conditional and unconditional offers pp. 773-800

Armando Gomes and Wilfredo Maldonado

Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency pp. 801-831

Z. Emel Öztürk

Aggregating experts’ opinions to select the winner of a competition pp. 833-849

Pablo Amoros

Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution pp. 851-873

Manfred Besner

Analytical solution of kth price auction pp. 875-884

Martin Mihelich and Yan Shu

Cyclic dominance in a two-person rock–scissors–paper game pp. 885-912

Liliana Garrido-da-Silva and Sofia B. S. D. Castro

Volume 49, issue 2, 2020

Dynamic network formation with foresighted agents pp. 345-384

Yangbo Song and Mihaela Schaar

Two-person pairwise solvable games pp. 385-409

Takuya Iimura, Toshimasa Maruta and Takahiro Watanabe

Information disclosure by a seller in sequential first-price auctions pp. 411-444

Helmuts Azacis

Bilateral trading with contingent contracts pp. 445-461

Kiho Yoon

Equilibrium payoffs and proposal ratios in bargaining models pp. 463-494

Shunsuke Hanato

Capacity precommitment, communication, and collusive pricing: theoretical benchmark and experimental evidence pp. 495-524

Werner Güth, Manfred Stadler and Alexandra Zaby

Market power in bilateral oligopoly markets with non-expandable infrastructures pp. 525-546

Yukihiko Funaki, Harold Houba and Evgenia Motchenkova

Information sharing in democratic mechanisms pp. 547-577

Volker Britz and Hans Gersbach

The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games pp. 579-599

Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo, Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo and Estela Sánchez Rodríguez

Contracting with moral hazard, adverse selection and risk neutrality: when does one size fit all? pp. 601-637

Felipe Balmaceda

Rewarding moderate behavior in a dynamic Nash Demand Game pp. 639-650

Shiran Rachmilevitch

A model of parallel contests pp. 651-672

Wei-Torng Juang, Guang-Zhen Sun and Kuo-Chih Yuan

Volume 49, issue 1, 2020

Labelling, homophily and preference evolution pp. 1-22

Jiabin Wu

On the strategic value of ‘shooting yourself in the foot’: an experimental study of burning money pp. 23-45

Michal Krol and Magdalena Ewa Krol

A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability pp. 47-74

Daniel Danau and Annalisa Vinella

Dominance of weighted nested split graph networks in connections models pp. 75-96

Norma Olaizola and Federico Valenciano

Population monotonic allocation schemes for games with externalities pp. 97-117

Takaaki Abe

Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory pp. 119-145

Aleksei Kondratev and Vladimir V. Mazalov

Fair division in the presence of externalities pp. 147-172

Oskar Skibski and Tomasz Michalak

Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems pp. 173-193

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga

A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information pp. 195-225

Andrés Salamanca Lugo

Associated consistency, value and graphs pp. 227-249

Gerard Hamiache and Florian Navarro

Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information pp. 251-273

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg Baranov

Market sentiments and convergence dynamics in decentralized assignment economies pp. 275-298

Bary S. R. Pradelski and Heinrich H. Nax

Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity pp. 299-320

Ori Haimanko

The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games pp. 321-344

Jasper Jong and Marc Uetz

Volume 48, issue 4, 2019

Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment pp. 1001-1031

Oliver Kirchkamp and J. Philipp Reiß

Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games pp. 1033-1054

Jiwoong Lee, Rudolf Müller and Dries Vermeulen

Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching pp. 1055-1085

Bo Chen

Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions pp. 1087-1109

Tamás Solymosi

Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval pp. 1111-1137

Bertrand Mbama Engoulou and Lawrence Diffo Lambo

Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers pp. 1139-1167

Daeyoung Jeong

Self-recognition in teams pp. 1169-1201

Joshua Gans and Peter Landry

Lies and consequences pp. 1203-1240

Ivan Balbuzanov

Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games pp. 1241-1275

Geir Asheim and Andrés Perea

Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté pp. 1277-1296

Aviad Heifetz

Volume 48, issue 3, 2019

Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives pp. 713-753

Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber and Alexei Zakharov

Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value pp. 755-768

Ori Haimanko

An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems pp. 769-779

Yongsheng Xu and Naoki Yoshihara

Multiplayer games as extension of misère games pp. 781-796

Koki Suetsugu

Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma pp. 797-834

Kenju Kamei

Paths to stable allocations pp. 835-862

Ágnes Cseh and Martin Skutella

Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization pp. 863-886

Stefano Vannucci

Dynamic matching pennies on networks pp. 887-920

Zhigang Cao, Cheng-zhong Qin, Xiaoguang Yang and Boyu Zhang

Strategic information transmission despite conflict pp. 921-956

Stéphan Sémirat

Matching with restricted trade pp. 957-977

Mustafa Afacan

Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games pp. 979-997

André Casajus and Koji Yokote

My scientific first-born: a clarification pp. 999-1000

Robert Aumann

Volume 48, issue 2, 2019

Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching pp. 365-392

Jens Gudmundsson

PSPACE-complete two-color planar placement games pp. 393-410

Kyle Burke and Robert A. Hearn

On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players pp. 411-421

Avishay Aiche

Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata pp. 423-431

O. V. Baskov

On random stable partitions pp. 433-480

Boris Pittel

Differential game of optimal pursuit of one evader by many pursuers pp. 481-490

Mehdi Salimi and Massimiliano Ferrara

A generalization of Arc-Kayles pp. 491-511

Antoine Dailly, Valentin Gledel and Marc Heinrich

Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions pp. 513-541

János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen and Anna Zseleva

Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects pp. 543-569

Tomoya Tajika and Tomoya Kazumura

Limited focus in dynamic games pp. 571-607

Andrés Perea and Elias Tsakas

Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable pp. 609-645

Martin Van der Linden

On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention pp. 647-671

Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, Bertrand Tchantcho and Bill Proces Tsague

Rationalizability in multicriteria games pp. 673-685

Yasuo Sasaki

Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference pp. 687-712

Alice Peng-Ju Su

Volume 48, issue 1, 2019

Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices pp. 1-32

Peter Streufert

General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games pp. 33-59

Gaëtan Fournier

Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency? pp. 61-80

Philipp E. Otto and Daniel Dittmer

An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration pp. 81-108

Brian R. Powers

Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information pp. 109-141

Zhuozheng Li, Huanxing Yang and Lan Zhang

The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining pp. 143-155

Suchan Chae and Seho Kim

The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs pp. 157-179

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

An epistemic approach to stochastic games pp. 181-203

Andrés Perea and Arkadi Predtetchinski

Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information pp. 205-242

William Phan

Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems pp. 243-266

Eun Jeong Heo

Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring pp. 267-285

Daehyun Kim

Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions pp. 287-310

Pedro Calleja and Francesc Llerena

Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences pp. 311-336

Andrea Gallice

Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies pp. 337-361

Sven O. Krumke, Clemens Thielen, Philipp Weinschenk and Stephan Westphal