Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Antonio Romero-Medina and Matteo Triossi
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Antonio Romero-Medina: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 1, No 6, 105-118

Abstract: Abstract We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

Keywords: Many-to-many; Acyclicity; Stability; Strategy-proofness; C71; C78; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1

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