Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
Matteo Triossi () and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Antonio Romero Medina ()
UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
We study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many to-many matching markets. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.
Keywords: Singleton; core; Two-sided; Group; Strategy-proofness; Stability; Acyclicity; Many-to-many; markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 D71 C78 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:26081
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ana Poveda ().