Fair reallocation in economies with single-peaked preferences

Kazuhiko Hashimoto () and Takuma Wakayama
Additional contact information
Kazuhiko Hashimoto: Osaka University of Economics

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 3, No 11, 773-785

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of fairly reallocating the individual endowments of a perfectly divisible good among agents with single-peaked preferences. As agents may have different individual endowments in this problem, the standard concept of envy-freeness cannot be applied directly. Thus, we propose a new concept of fairness, which we call envy-freeness for similarities. It requires that each agent whose best amount is strictly greater (less) than his individual endowment should not envy another agent whose best amount and assignment are strictly greater (less) than her individual endowment. We then construct a rule satisfying envy-freeness for similarities and some other desirable properties. In doing so, we propose a new extension of the well-known uniform rule for the reallocation problem, which we call the gross uniform reallocation rule. Moreover, we show that the gross uniform reallocation rule is the only rule that satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and envy-freeness for similarities.

Keywords: Envy-freeness; Individual rationality; Uniform rule; Single-peaked preferences; Strategy-proofness; D71; D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-021-00767-z Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: Fair Reallocation in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:50:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-021-00767-z

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/182/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00767-z

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Game Theory is currently edited by Shmuel Zamir, Vijay Krishna and Bernhard von Stengel

More articles in International Journal of Game Theory from Springer, Game Theory Society
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().