Strategy-proof and Pareto efficient allocation of indivisible goods: general impossibility domains

Shinji Ohseto ()
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Shinji Ohseto: Tohoku University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2021, vol. 50, issue 2, No 5, 419-432

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of allocating several homogeneous indivisible goods when monetary transfers among agents are possible. We study the possibility of constructing strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanisms on restricted domains of agents’ valuation profiles. We show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism under the weak domain condition that all agents’ sets of possible valuations share at least four common valuations satisfying a certain inequality. Moreover, we prove that this impossibility result is robust to any affine transformation of domains, and we examine this impossibility result when the set of agent’s possible valuations consists of finite integers.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Restricted domain; Indivisible good; Monetary transfer (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00754-4

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